# T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Scheduled Task/Job activity in the context of Execution/Persistence/Privilege Escalation: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| File Analysis | Detect | Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| File Encryption | Harden | Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| File Eviction | Evict | Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. |
| Content Filtering | Isolate | Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(5m)
| where FileName in~ ("schtasks.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/create"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("SYSTEM", "/rl highest")
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    DeviceName,
    DeviceId,
    AccountName,
    ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessAccountName,
    InitiatingProcessSHA256
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,
         HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,
         AccountCustomEntity = AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```
```kql
// File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware
let timeFrame = 5m;
CyfirmaIndicators_CL 
| where ConfidenceScore >= 80
    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
    and pattern contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains "Malware")
| extend MD5 = extract(@"file:hashes\.md5\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{32})'", 1, pattern)
| extend SHA1 = extract(@"file:hashes\.'SHA-1'\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{40})'", 1, pattern)
| extend SHA256 = extract(@"file:hashes\.'SHA-256'\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{64})'", 1, pattern)
| extend
    Algo_MD5='md5',
    Algo_SHA1= 'SHA1',
    Algo_SHA256='SHA256',
    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',
    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'
| project  
    MD5,
    Algo_MD5,
    SHA1,
    Algo_SHA1,
    SHA256,
    Algo_SHA256,
    ThreatActors,
    Sources,
    RecommendedActions,
    Roles,
    Country,
    name,
    Description,
    ConfidenceScore,
    SecurityVendors,
    IndicatorID,
    created,
    modified,
    valid_from,
    Tags,
    ThreatType,
    TimeGenerated,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName
```
```kql
//Trojan Network Indicators - Block Recommended
let timeFrame= 5m;
CyfirmaIndicators_CL 
| where ConfidenceScore >= 80
    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
    and pattern !contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and Roles has 'Trojan'
| extend IPv4 = extract(@"ipv4-addr:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend IPv6 = extract(@"ipv6-addr:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend URL = extract(@"url:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend Domain = extract(@"domain-name:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend parsed = parse_json(extensions)
| extend extensionKeys = bag_keys(parsed)
| mv-expand extensionKeys
| extend extensionKeyStr = tostring(extensionKeys)
| extend ext = parsed[extensionKeyStr]
| extend props = ext.properties
| extend 
    extension_id = extensionKeyStr,
    ASN_Owner = props.asn_owner,
    ASN = props.asn,
    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',
    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'
| project
    IPv4,
    IPv6,
    URL,
    Domain,
    ThreatActors,
    RecommendedActions,
    Sources,
    Roles,
    Country,
    IPAbuse,
    name,
    Description,
    ConfidenceScore,
    IndicatorID,
    created,
    modified,
    valid_from,
    Tags,
    ThreatType,
    TimeGenerated,
    SecurityVendors,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Scheduled Task/Job activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.