# T1070 - Indicator Removal

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Indicator Removal activity in the context of Stealth: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Application Exception Monitoring | Detect | Monitor for Application Exception Monitoring indicators relevant to this technique. |
| File Encryption | Harden | Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| File Eviction | Evict | Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. |
| Network Resource Access Mediation | Isolate | Apply Network Resource Access Mediation to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Treat as P1 — notify SOC Manager and customer | Low | Yes | No |
| MDE telemetry is now the primary forensic source — pull all | Low | No | Yes |
| Isolate device for forensic imaging | Medium | No | Yes |
| Open full IR investigation — assume compromise preceded the | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(5m)
| where EventID in (1102, 104)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, Activity, EventID
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,
         HostCustomEntity = Computer,
         AccountCustomEntity = Account
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```
```kql
// High Severity - Attack Surface - Misconfiguration Detected
let timeFrame = 5m;
CyfirmaASConfigurationAlerts_CL
| where severity == 'Critical' and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
| extend
    Description=description,
    FirstSeen=first_seen,
    LastSeen=last_seen,
    RiskScore=risk_score,
    Domain=sub_domain,
    TopDomain=top_domain,
    NetworkIP=ip,
    AlertUID=alert_uid,
    UID=uid,
    Softwares=software,
    WebAppFirewall=web_app_firewall,
    ClickJackingDefence=click_jacking_defence,
    ContentSecurityPolicy=content_security_policy,
    CookieXssProtection=cookie_xss_protection,
    DataInjectionDefence=data_injection_defence,
    DomainStatus=domain_status,
    MissingEPPCodes=missing_epp_codes,
    SecureCookie=secure_cookie,
    SetCookieHttpsOnly=set_cookie_https_only,
    XFrameOptions=x_frame_options,
    X_XssProtection=x_xss_protection,
    ProviderName='CYFIRMA',
    ProductName='DeCYFIR/DeTCT'
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    Description,
    Domain,
    TopDomain,
    RiskScore,
    FirstSeen,
    LastSeen,
    NetworkIP,
    AlertUID,
    UID,
    Softwares,
    WebAppFirewall,
    ClickJackingDefence,
    ContentSecurityPolicy,
    CookieXssProtection,
    DataInjectionDefence,
    DomainStatus,
    MissingEPPCodes,
    SecureCookie,
    SetCookieHttpsOnly,
    XFrameOptions,
    X_XssProtection,
    ProviderName,
    ProductName
```
```kql
McAfeeEPOEvent
| where ThreatActionTaken in~ ('none', 'IDS_ACTION_WOULD_BLOCK')
| extend IPCustomEntity = DvcIpAddr
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Indicator Removal activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.