# T1072 - Software Deployment Tools

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Software Deployment Tools activity in the context of Execution/Lateral Movement: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Service Binary Verification | Detect | Monitor for Service Binary Verification indicators relevant to this technique. |
| Software Update | Harden | Apply Software Update to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| File Eviction | Evict | Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. |
| Content Filtering | Isolate | Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let known_processes = (
  imProcess
  // Change these values if adjusting Query Frequency or Query Period
  | where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))
  | where Process has_any ("Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}", "Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}")
  | summarize by Process);
  imProcess
  // Change these values if adjusting Query Frequency or Query Period
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
  | where Process has_any ("Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}", "Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}")
  | where Process !in (known_processes)
  | summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by Process, CommandLine, DvcHostname
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DvcHostname, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DvcHostname, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DvcHostname, DomainIndex + 1), DvcHostname)
  | project-away DomainIndex
```
```kql
let known_processes = (
  SecurityEvent
  // If adjusting Query Period or Frequency update these
  | where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))
  | where EventID == 4688
  | where NewProcessName has_any ("Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}", "Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}")
  | summarize by Process);
  SecurityEvent
  // If adjusting Query Period or Frequency update these
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
  | where EventID == 4688
  | where NewProcessName has_any ("Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}", "Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}")
  | where Process !in (known_processes)
  // This will likely apply to multiple hosts so summarize these data
  | summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, Computer
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
```
```kql
let timeframe = 3d;
// Get Release Pipeline Creation Events and group by day
ADOAuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where OperationName =~ "Release.ReleasePipelineCreated"
// Group by day
| extend timekey = bin(TimeGenerated, 1d)
| extend PipelineId = tostring(Data.PipelineId)
| extend PipelineName = tostring(Data.PipelineName)
// Rename some columns to make output clearer
| project-rename TimeCreated = TimeGenerated, CreatingUser = ActorUPN, CreatingUserAgent = UserAgent, CreatingIP = IpAddress
// Join with Release Pipeline Deletions where Pipeline ID is the same and deletion occurred on same day as creation
| join (ADOAuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where OperationName =~ "Release.ReleasePipelineDeleted"
// Group by day
| extend timekey = bin(TimeGenerated, 1d)
| extend PipelineId = tostring(Data.PipelineId)
| extend PipelineName = tostring(Data.PipelineName)
// Rename some things to make the output clearer
| project-rename TimeDeleted = TimeGenerated,DeletingUser = ActorUPN, DeletingUserAgent = UserAgent, DeletingIP = IpAddress) on PipelineId, timekey
| project TimeCreated, TimeDeleted, PipelineName, PipelineId, CreatingUser, CreatingIP, CreatingUserAgent, DeletingUser, DeletingIP, DeletingUserAgent, ScopeDisplayName, ProjectName, Data, OperationName, OperationName1
| extend timestamp = TimeCreated
| extend CreatingUserAccountName = tostring(split(CreatingUser, "@")[0]), CreatingUserAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(CreatingUser, "@")[1])
| extend DeletingUserAccountName = tostring(split(DeletingUser, "@")[0]), DeletingUserAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(DeletingUser, "@")[1])
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Software Deployment Tools activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.