# T1095 - Non-Application Layer Protocol

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Non-Application Layer Protocol activity in the context of Command and Control: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis | Detect | Monitor for User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| Network Traffic Filtering | Isolate | Apply Network Traffic Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let lb_period = 14d;
let q_time = 1h;
let inet_access_proc = CyberArkEPM
| where TimeGenerated between (ago(lb_period) .. ago(q_time))
| where EventSubType =~ 'DetectAccessInternet'
| where isnotempty(ActingProcessFileInternalName)
| summarize makeset(ActingProcessFileInternalName);
CyberArkEPM
| where TimeGenerated > ago(q_time)
| where EventSubType =~ 'DetectAccessInternet'
| where ActingProcessFileInternalName !in (inet_access_proc)
| extend AccountCustomEntity = ActorUsername
```
```kql
GCPCloudDNS
| where Query has_any ('tomasubiera.com', 'theandersonco.com', 'stonecrestnews.com', 'nordicmademedia.com')
| extend DNSCustomEntity = Query, IPCustomEntity = SrcIpAddr
```
```kql
let ip_check = dynamic(['whatismyipaddress.com', 'ip2location.com', 'ipaddress.my', 'whatismyip.com', 'ipinfo.info', 'checkmyip.com', 'myip.com', 'checkmyip.org', 'canireachthe.net', 'ipv4.icanhazip.com', 'ip.anysrc.net', 'edns.ip-api.com', 'wtfismyip.com', 'checkip.dyndns.org', 'api.2ip.ua', 'icanhazip.com', 'api.ipify.org', 'ip-api.com', 'checkip.amazonaws.com', 'ipecho.net', 'ipinfo.io', 'ipv4bot.whatismyipaddress.com', 'freegeoip.app', 'checkip.azurewebsites.net']);
GCPCloudDNS
| where Query in~ (ip_check)
| extend DNSCustomEntity = Query, IPCustomEntity = SrcIpAddr
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Non-Application Layer Protocol activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.