# T1134 - Access Token Manipulation

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Access Token Manipulation activity in the context of Stealth/Privilege Escalation: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Application Exception Monitoring | Detect | Monitor for Application Exception Monitoring indicators relevant to this technique. |
| Credential Hardening | Harden | Apply Credential Hardening to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| Session Termination | Evict | Use Session Termination to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. |
| System Call Filtering | Isolate | Apply System Call Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Isolate device | Medium | No | Yes |
| Reset the password of the impersonated account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Check what was accessed with the elevated token | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let SuspiciousInitiators = dynamic([
    "cmd.exe",
    "powershell.exe",
    "pwsh.exe",
    "wscript.exe",
    "cscript.exe",
    "mshta.exe",
    "rundll32.exe",
    "regsvr32.exe"
]);
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(1h)
| where LogonType == "NewCredentials"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (SuspiciousInitiators)
| project
    Timestamp,
    DeviceName,
    AccountName,
    LogonType,
    InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    RemoteIP
| extend timestamp = Timestamp,
         HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,
         AccountCustomEntity = AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```
```kql
AWSSecurityHubFindings
| where RecordState == "ACTIVE" and ComplianceStatus == "FAILED"
| where tostring(AwsSecurityFindingGeneratorId) == "security-control/IAM.4"
  or tostring(ComplianceSecurityControlId) == "IAM.4"
| extend RootUserARN = tostring(Resources[0].Id)
| summarize TimeGenerated = max(TimeGenerated) by AwsAccountId, AwsRegion, AwsSecurityFindingTitle, AwsSecurityFindingDescription, AwsSecurityFindingId, ComplianceSecurityControlId, RootUserARN
```
```kql
Pathlock_TDnR_CL
| where DataSource == "PATHLOCK_DAC"
| project TimeGenerated, Sysid, DataSource, Eventid, Instance, Hostname, Bname,
          Tcode, Report, Area, Subid, SrcIp, DestIp, AffectedUser, LogLine,
          MsgType, MsgId, MsgNo, MessageV1, MessageV2, MessageV3, MessageV4, CentralTs
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Access Token Manipulation activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.