# T1555 - Credentials from Password Stores

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Credentials from Password Stores activity in the context of Credential Access: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| File Analysis | Detect | Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| File Encryption | Harden | Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| File Eviction | Evict | Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. |
| Content Filtering | Isolate | Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let CredentialStoreFiles = dynamic([
    "Login Data",
    "logins.json",
    "key4.db"
]);
let BrowserProcesses = dynamic([
    "chrome.exe",
    "msedge.exe",
    "firefox.exe",
    "brave.exe"
]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)
| where FileName in~ (CredentialStoreFiles)
| where ActionType in~ ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ (BrowserProcesses)
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    DeviceName,
    DeviceId,
    AccountName = RequestAccountName,
    FileName,
    FolderPath,
    ActionType,
    InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessSHA256
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,
         HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,
         AccountCustomEntity = AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```
```kql
let loginRec = FortyTwoCrunchAPIProtection
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(5m) 
| project-away NonBlockingMode, SourcePort, DestinationPort, Query, ApiId, RequestHeader, ResponseHeader, Errors, EventType, Uuid
| where UriPath has "/api/login?user=" and Status == 403;
let recCount = iff((toscalar(loginRec | count) > 10), 1, 0);
loginRec | take recCount
```
```kql
Authomize_v2_CL
| where ingestion_time() >= ago(30m)
| extend EventID = id_s, Policy = policy_name_s, Severity = severity_s,Description = description_s,Recommendation = recommendation_s,URL = url_s,Tactics = tactics_s
| where Policy has "Password Exfiltration over SCIM application"
| project  EventID, Policy, Severity, Description, Recommendation, URL, Category, Tactics
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Credentials from Password Stores activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.