# T1560 - Archive Collected Data

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Archive Collected Data activity in the context of Collection: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| File Analysis | Detect | Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| File Encryption | Harden | Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| File Eviction | Evict | Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. |
| Content Filtering | Isolate | Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let ArchiveTools = dynamic([
    "7z.exe",
    "7za.exe",
    "winrar.exe",
    "rar.exe",
    "tar.exe"
]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)
| where FileName in~ (ArchiveTools)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-p", "/p", "a -", "-hp")
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    DeviceName,
    DeviceId,
    AccountName,
    FileName,
    ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    FolderPath
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,
         HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,
         AccountCustomEntity = AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```
```kql
TheomAlerts_CL
  | where customProps_RuleId_s == "TRIS0032" and (priority_s == "P1" or priority_s == "P2")
```
```kql
TheomAlerts_CL
  | where customProps_RuleId_s == "TRIS0032" and (priority_s == "P1" or priority_s == "P2")
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Archive Collected Data activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.