# T1568 - Dynamic Resolution

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Dynamic Resolution activity in the context of Command and Control: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Relay Pattern Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Relay Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| DNS Denylisting | Isolate | Apply DNS Denylisting to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Block the parent domain at firewall and DNS sinkhole | Medium | No | Yes |
| Isolate device if process confirmed malicious | Medium | No | Yes |
| Submit IOCs to Sentinel TI watchlist | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let TrustedDomains = dynamic([
    "microsoft.com", "windows.com", "office.com", "azure.com", "google.com",
    "amazonaws.com", "akamai.com", "cloudflare.com", "digicert.com"
]);
let Tunnelling = (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(1h)
    | where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse"
    | where not(RemoteUrl has_any (TrustedDomains))
    | extend DomainLen = strlen(RemoteUrl)
    | where DomainLen > 50 or RemoteUrl matches regex @"[a-z0-9]{20,}\."
    | summarize QueryCount = count(), UniqueDomains = dcount(RemoteUrl), SampleDomains = make_set(RemoteUrl, 5)
        by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName
    | where QueryCount > 30
    | extend DetectionType = "DNS_Tunnelling"
);
let DGA = (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(1h)
    | where ActionType == "ConnectionFailed"
    | where not(RemoteUrl has_any (TrustedDomains))
    | summarize FailCount = count(), UniqueDomains = dcount(RemoteUrl), SampleDomains = make_set(RemoteUrl, 5)
        by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName
    | where FailCount > 100 and UniqueDomains > 50
    | extend DetectionType = "DGA_Pattern"
);
Tunnelling
| union DGA
| extend timestamp = now(), HostCustomEntity = DeviceName
| order by QueryCount desc
```
```kql
// Network Indicators query with Block Recommended Action and C2 Roles
let timeFrame= 5m;
CyfirmaIndicators_CL 
| where ConfidenceScore >= 80
    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
    and pattern !contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains 'c2' or Roles contains 'Command & Control')
| extend IPv4 = extract(@"ipv4-addr:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend IPv6 = extract(@"ipv6-addr:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend URL = extract(@"url:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend Domain = extract(@"domain-name:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend parsed = parse_json(extensions)
| extend extensionKeys = bag_keys(parsed)
| mv-expand extensionKeys
| extend extensionKeyStr = tostring(extensionKeys)
| extend ext = parsed[extensionKeyStr]
| extend props = ext.properties
| extend 
    extension_id = extensionKeyStr,
    ASN_Owner = props.asn_owner,
    ASN = props.asn,
    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',
    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'
| project
    IPv4,
    IPv6,
    URL,
    Domain,
    ThreatActors,
    RecommendedActions,
    Sources,
    Roles,
    Country,
    IPAbuse,
    name,
    Description,
    ConfidenceScore,
    IndicatorID,
    created,
    modified,
    valid_from,
    Tags,
    ThreatType,
    TimeGenerated,
    SecurityVendors,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName
```
```kql
// Network Indicators query with Monitor Recommended Action And C2 Roles
let timeFrame= 5m;
CyfirmaIndicators_CL 
| where ConfidenceScore >= 80
    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
    and pattern !contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Monitor' and (Roles contains 'c2' or Roles contains 'Command & Control')
| extend IPv4 = extract(@"ipv4-addr:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend IPv6 = extract(@"ipv6-addr:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend URL = extract(@"url:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend Domain = extract(@"domain-name:value\s*=\s*'([^']+)'", 1, pattern)
| extend parsed = parse_json(extensions)
| extend extensionKeys = bag_keys(parsed)
| mv-expand extensionKeys
| extend extensionKeyStr = tostring(extensionKeys)
| extend ext = parsed[extensionKeyStr]
| extend props = ext.properties
| extend 
    extension_id = extensionKeyStr,
    ASN_Owner = props.asn_owner,
    ASN = props.asn,
    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',
    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'
| project
    IPv4,
    IPv6,
    URL,
    Domain,
    ThreatActors,
    RecommendedActions,
    Sources,
    Roles,
    Country,
    IPAbuse,
    name,
    Description,
    ConfidenceScore,
    IndicatorID,
    created,
    modified,
    valid_from,
    Tags,
    ThreatType,
    TimeGenerated,
    SecurityVendors,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Dynamic Resolution activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

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