# T1574 - Hijack Execution Flow

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Hijack Execution Flow activity in the context of Stealth/Execution: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| File Analysis | Detect | Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| File Encryption | Harden | Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| File Eviction | Evict | Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. |
| Content Filtering | Isolate | Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quarantine the malicious DLL | Low | No | Yes |
| Block SHA256 in MDE custom indicators | Medium | No | Yes |
| If loaded by a widely-deployed application: check all other | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(5m)
| where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("windows\\system32", "windows\\syswow64", "program files"))
| where FileName endswith ".dll"
| where not(FolderPath has_any ("windows\\system32", "windows\\syswow64", "program files", "winsxs"))
| where isnotempty(SHA1)
| where IsSigned == false
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsMpEng.exe", "SenseCE.exe")
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    DeviceName,
    AccountName,
    InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
    FileName,
    FolderPath,
    SHA256,
    IsSigned
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,
         HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,
         AccountCustomEntity = AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```
```kql
// Suspicious commands launched by web server processes
DeviceProcessEvents 
| where (((InitiatingProcessParentFileName in("w3wp.exe", "beasvc.exe",
    "httpd.exe") or InitiatingProcessParentFileName startswith "tomcat")
    or InitiatingProcessFileName in("w3wp.exe", "beasvc.exe", "httpd.exe") or
    InitiatingProcessFileName startswith "tomcat"))
    and FileName in~('cmd.exe', 'powershell.exe')
| where ProcessCommandLine contains '%temp%'
    or ProcessCommandLine has 'wget'
    or ProcessCommandLine has 'whoami'
    or ProcessCommandLine has 'certutil'
    or ProcessCommandLine has 'systeminfo'
    or ProcessCommandLine has 'ping'
    or ProcessCommandLine has 'ipconfig'
    or ProcessCommandLine has 'timeout'
| summarize
    take_any(FileName),
    make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 100000),
    take_any(InitiatingProcessFileName),
    take_any(InitiatingProcessParentFileName)
    by DeviceId, DeviceName
| extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)
| extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), "")
```
```kql
let guids = dynamic(["{ddc05a5a-351a-4e06-8eaf-54ec1bc2dcea}","{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}","{4590f811-1d3a-11d0-891f-00aa004b2e24}", "{4de225bf-cf59-4cfc-85f7-68b90f185355}", "{F56F6FDD-AA9D-4618-A949-C1B91AF43B1A}"]);
  let mde_data = DeviceRegistryEvents
  | where ActionType =~ "RegistryValueSet"
  | where RegistryKey contains "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID"
  | where RegistryKey has_any (guids)
  | where RegistryValueData has "System32\\spool\\drivers\\color";
  let event_data = SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 4657
  | where ObjectName contains "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID"
  | where ObjectName has_any (guids)
  | where NewValue has "System32\\spool\\drivers\\color"
  | extend RegistryKey = ObjectName, RegistryValueData = NewValue, DeviceName=Computer, InitiatingProcessFileName = Process, InitiatingProcessAccountName=SubjectUserName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain = SubjectDomainName;
  union mde_data, event_data
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Hijack Execution Flow activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.