# T1596 - Search Open Technical Databases

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Search Open Technical Databases activity in the context of Reconnaissance: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let SuspiciousCommands= pack_array('iam.list-users', 'iam.list-groups', 'ec2.describe-vpcs', 'ec2.describe-subnets', 'route53.list-hosted-zones', 'kms.list-keys', 'kms.list-aliases', 'ecs.list-clusters', 'ecs.list-services', 'iam.list-roles', 'iam.get-user''iam.list-access-keys', 'ec2.describe-security-groups', 'ec2.describe-network-acls', 'ec2.describe-network-interfaces', 'ec2.describe-route-tables', 'ec2.describe-internet-gateways', 'ec2.describe-vpc-peering-connections', 'ec2.describe-network-interfaces', 'ec2.describe-network-interfaces', 'ec2.describe-transit-gateway-vpc-attachment', 'ec2.describe-vpc');
// Retrieve AWS CloudTrail events
AWSCloudTrail 
// Filter events with UserAgent starting with "aws-cli"
| where UserAgent startswith "aws-cli" 
// Extract the command from the UserAgent using string splitting
| extend command = tostring(split(UserAgent, "off command/", 1)[0])  
// Filter events based on predefined suspicious command list
| where command has_any (SuspiciousCommands)  
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
// Summarize relevant information for further analysis
| summarize 
    CommadCount = dcount(command), 
    EventCount = dcount(EventName), 
    commands = make_list(command), 
    Events = make_list(EventName) 
    by 
    bin(TimeGenerated, 1min), 
    RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, 
    UserIdentityUserName, 
    SourceIpAddress, 
    SessionMfaAuthenticated 
// Filter out results with a sufficient count of unique suspicious commands in 1 min time window
| where CommadCount >= 8
```
```kql
FireworkV2_CL
| where notempty(uid) and RiskScore >= 3
| extend index_name = split(uid, "/")[0]
| where index_name == "service"
```
```kql
Alerts_advisory
| where Service == "advisory" 
| extend MappedSeverity = Severity
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Search Open Technical Databases activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.