{ "technique_id": "T1047", "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "priority": "high", "status": "complete", "version": "0.1.0", "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23", "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix", "tactics": [ "Execution" ], "platforms": [ "Windows" ], "summary": "Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components...", "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Windows Management Instrumentation activity in the context of Execution: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.", "d3fend_mappings": [ { "id": "D3-SCA", "name": "System Call Analysis", "relationship": "detect", "practical_action": "Monitor for System Call Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.", "tooling": [ "Defender for Endpoint" ] }, { "id": "D3-SCF", "name": "System Call Filtering", "relationship": "isolate", "practical_action": "Apply System Call Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.", "tooling": [ "Defender for Endpoint" ] } ], "investigation_steps": { "microsoft": [ "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.", "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.", "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource." ], "generic": [ "Confirm whether the observed windows management instrumentation activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.", "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.", "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.", "Real detection reference: \"WMI Spawns Shell Process\" -- Flags WmiPrvSE.exe (WMI Provider Host) spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe, a pattern consistent with WMI-based remote execution, persistence, or lateral movement." ] }, "evidence_to_collect": [ "Host or resource affected", "Account or identity involved", "Timestamp of the activity", "Related process, file, or network artifact", "Any preceding or follow-on alerts" ], "response_actions": [ { "name": "Kill the WMI-spawned process via MDE Live Response", "category": "Response", "risk": "Low", "automation_safe": false, "approval_required": true, "tool": "Defender for Endpoint" }, { "name": "If remote WMI: isolate origin host and investigate lateral m", "category": "Response", "risk": "Medium", "automation_safe": false, "approval_required": true, "tool": "See investigation guide", "notes": "If remote WMI: isolate origin host and investigate lateral movement" }, { "name": "Check and remove any WMI event subscriptions (persistence)", "category": "Response", "risk": "Low", "automation_safe": true, "approval_required": false, "tool": "See investigation guide" } ], "queries": { "kql": [ { "name": "GEN-EX-002 — WMI Spawns Shell Process", "description": "Flags WmiPrvSE.exe (WMI Provider Host) spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe, a pattern consistent with WMI-based remote execution, persistence, or lateral movement. (Source: Bell Integration baseline detection library.)", "query": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(5m)\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"WmiPrvSE.exe\"\n| where FileName in~ (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\")\n| project\n TimeGenerated,\n DeviceName,\n AccountName,\n InitiatingProcessFileName,\n FileName,\n ProcessCommandLine,\n SHA256\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,\n HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,\n AccountCustomEntity = AccountName\n| order by TimeGenerated desc" }, { "name": "ef88eb96-861c-43a0-ab16-f3835a97c928 — Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command Line", "description": "This query identifies use of PowerShell Empire's cmdlets within the command line data of the PowerShell process, indicating potential use of the post-exploitation tool.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)", "query": "let regexEmpire = tostring(toscalar(externaldata(cmdlets:string)[@\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/EmpireCommandString.txt\"] with (format=\"txt\")));\n(union isfuzzy=true\n (SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4688\n//consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur\n//where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\",\"powershell_ise.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\")\n| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))\n| where CommandLine has \"-encodedCommand\"\n| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * \"-EncodedCommand \" encodedCommand\n| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has \" \", tostring(split(encodedCommand, \" \")[0]), encodedCommand)\n// Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8\n| extend decodedCommand = translate('\\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) - (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)\n| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)\n| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire\n| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName\n| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')\n),\n(WindowsEvent\n| where EventID == 4688\n| where EventData has_any (\"-encodedCommand\", \"powershell.exe\",\"powershell_ise.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\")\n| where not(EventData has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))\n//consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur\n//extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)\n//extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\\\')[-1])\n//FileName = Process\n//where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\",\"powershell_ise.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\")\n| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)\n| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))\n| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)\n| where CommandLine has \"-encodedCommand\"\n| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * \"-EncodedCommand \" encodedCommand\n| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has \" \", tostring(split(encodedCommand, \" \")[0]), encodedCommand)\n// Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8\n| extend decodedCommand = translate('\\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) - (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)\n| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)\n| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire\n| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)\n| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)\n| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)\n| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\\\')[-1])\n| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName\n| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')\n))" } ], "spl": [], "esql": [ { "name": "acf738b5-b5b2-4acc-bad9-1e18ee234f40 — Suspicious Managed Code Hosting Process", "description": "(EQL) Identifies a suspicious managed code hosting process which could indicate code injection or other form of suspicious code execution. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)", "query": "file where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.type != \"deletion\" and\n file.name : (\"wscript.exe.log\",\n \"cscript.exe.log\",\n \"mshta.exe.log\",\n \"wmic.exe.log\",\n \"svchost.exe.log\",\n \"dllhost.exe.log\",\n \"cmstp.exe.log\",\n \"regsvr32.exe.log\")" }, { "name": "12f07955-1674-44f7-86b5-c35da0a6f41a — Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI", "description": "(EQL) Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)", "query": "process where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.type == \"start\" and\n process.parent.name : \"WmiPrvSE.exe\" and process.name : \"cmd.exe\" and process.args : \"/c\" and process.args:\"/Q\" and \n process.args : \"2>&1\" and process.args: \"1>\" and \n process.args : (\"C:\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*.txt\", \"\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\", \"-encodehex\", \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\C$\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\", \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\ADMIN$\\\\__*.*\")" } ] }, "automation": { "safe": [ "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.", "Run enrichment queries.", "Create ServiceNow SecOps task." ], "approval_required": [ "Contain or disable the affected host/account.", "Any change to production configuration." ] }, "escalation_criteria": [ "Windows Management Instrumentation activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.", "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.", "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent." ], "false_positive_considerations": [ "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.", "Approved security testing or red team exercise.", "Known benign software producing similar telemetry." ], "confluence": { "title": "T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation Response Guidance", "labels": [ "mitre", "attack", "d3fend", "secops", "basyrix" ], "sections": [ "summary", "d3fend_mappings", "investigation_steps", "response_actions", "queries", "automation", "escalation_criteria", "false_positive_considerations" ] } }