{ "technique_id": "T1053", "name": "Scheduled Task/Job", "priority": "high", "status": "draft", "version": "0.1.0", "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23", "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix", "tactics": [ "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation" ], "platforms": [ "Containers", "ESXi", "Linux", "macOS", "Network Devices", "Windows" ], "summary": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments)...", "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Scheduled Task/Job activity in the context of Execution/Persistence/Privilege Escalation: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.", "d3fend_mappings": [ { "id": "D3-FA", "name": "File Analysis", "relationship": "detect", "practical_action": "Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.", "tooling": [ "Defender for Endpoint" ] }, { "id": "D3-FE", "name": "File Encryption", "relationship": "harden", "practical_action": "Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs.", "tooling": [ "Defender for Endpoint" ] }, { "id": "D3-FEV", "name": "File Eviction", "relationship": "evict", "practical_action": "Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed.", "tooling": [ "Defender for Endpoint" ] }, { "id": "D3-CF", "name": "Content Filtering", "relationship": "isolate", "practical_action": "Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.", "tooling": [ "Defender for Endpoint" ] } ], "investigation_steps": { "microsoft": [ "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.", "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.", "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource." ], "generic": [ "Confirm whether the observed scheduled task/job activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.", "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.", "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.", "Real detection reference: \"Scheduled Task Created to Run as SYSTEM\" -- Flags scheduled tasks created to run as SYSTEM/highest privilege by a non-SYSTEM initiating process." ] }, "evidence_to_collect": [ "Host or resource affected", "Account or identity involved", "Timestamp of the activity", "Related process, file, or network artifact", "Any preceding or follow-on alerts" ], "response_actions": [ { "name": "Contain the affected host or account", "category": "Containment", "risk": "Medium", "automation_safe": false, "approval_required": true, "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID", "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account." }, { "name": "Collect and preserve evidence", "category": "Investigation", "risk": "Low", "automation_safe": true, "approval_required": false, "tool": "Defender for Endpoint", "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection." } ], "queries": { "kql": [ { "name": "GEN-PE-007 — Scheduled Task Created to Run as SYSTEM", "description": "Flags scheduled tasks created to run as SYSTEM/highest privilege by a non-SYSTEM initiating process. (Source: Bell Integration baseline detection library, mapped via sub-technique T1053.005.)", "query": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(5m)\n| where FileName in~ (\"schtasks.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine has \"/create\"\n| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"SYSTEM\", \"/rl highest\")\n| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith \"$\"\n| project\n TimeGenerated,\n DeviceName,\n DeviceId,\n AccountName,\n ProcessCommandLine,\n InitiatingProcessFileName,\n InitiatingProcessCommandLine,\n InitiatingProcessAccountName,\n InitiatingProcessSHA256\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,\n HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,\n AccountCustomEntity = AccountName\n| order by TimeGenerated desc" }, { "name": "990fc0dc-e7a5-4f6d-bc24-8569652cd773 — CYFIRMA - High severity File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware", "description": "\"This KQL query retrieves file hash indicators (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) from the CyfirmaIndicators_CL table within the last 5 minutes. It filters records with a confidence score of 80 or higher, containing file hash patterns, a recommended action of 'Block', and roles marked as 'Malware'. Extracted hashes and key threat intelligence details are projected for Blocking and investigation.\" (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed), mapped via sub-technique T1053.005.)", "query": "// File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware\nlet timeFrame = 5m;\nCyfirmaIndicators_CL \n| where ConfidenceScore >= 80\n and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())\n and pattern contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains \"Malware\")\n| extend MD5 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.md5\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{32})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend SHA1 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.'SHA-1'\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{40})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend SHA256 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.'SHA-256'\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{64})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend\n Algo_MD5='md5',\n Algo_SHA1= 'SHA1',\n Algo_SHA256='SHA256',\n ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',\n ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'\n| project \n MD5,\n Algo_MD5,\n SHA1,\n Algo_SHA1,\n SHA256,\n Algo_SHA256,\n ThreatActors,\n Sources,\n RecommendedActions,\n Roles,\n Country,\n name,\n Description,\n ConfidenceScore,\n SecurityVendors,\n IndicatorID,\n created,\n modified,\n valid_from,\n Tags,\n ThreatType,\n TimeGenerated,\n ProductName,\n ProviderName" }, { "name": "441204ca-274f-43d2-aeda-53409b94f447 — CYFIRMA - High severity Trojan Network Indicators - Block Recommended Rule", "description": "\"This analytics rule detects network-based indicators flagged by CYFIRMA threat intelligence as associated with Command & Control (C2) infrastructure. These indicators may represent attacker-controlled endpoints used for persistence, data exfiltration, or command delivery to compromised systems.\" (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed), mapped via sub-technique T1053.005.)", "query": "//Trojan Network Indicators - Block Recommended\nlet timeFrame= 5m;\nCyfirmaIndicators_CL \n| where ConfidenceScore >= 80\n and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())\n and pattern !contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and Roles has 'Trojan'\n| extend IPv4 = extract(@\"ipv4-addr:value\\s*=\\s*'([^']+)'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend IPv6 = extract(@\"ipv6-addr:value\\s*=\\s*'([^']+)'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend URL = extract(@\"url:value\\s*=\\s*'([^']+)'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend Domain = extract(@\"domain-name:value\\s*=\\s*'([^']+)'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend parsed = parse_json(extensions)\n| extend extensionKeys = bag_keys(parsed)\n| mv-expand extensionKeys\n| extend extensionKeyStr = tostring(extensionKeys)\n| extend ext = parsed[extensionKeyStr]\n| extend props = ext.properties\n| extend \n extension_id = extensionKeyStr,\n ASN_Owner = props.asn_owner,\n ASN = props.asn,\n ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',\n ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'\n| project\n IPv4,\n IPv6,\n URL,\n Domain,\n ThreatActors,\n RecommendedActions,\n Sources,\n Roles,\n Country,\n IPAbuse,\n name,\n Description,\n ConfidenceScore,\n IndicatorID,\n created,\n modified,\n valid_from,\n Tags,\n ThreatType,\n TimeGenerated,\n SecurityVendors,\n ProductName,\n ProviderName" } ], "spl": [], "esql": [ { "name": "d9bfa475-270d-4b07-93cb-b1f49abe13da — Suspicious Echo or Printf Execution Detected via Defend for Containers", "description": "(EQL) This rule detects the execution of the echo/printf command to write data to potential persistence files, decode base64/32/16 and hex content or establish connections to a potential C2. The echo/printf commands are used to display a line of text or write data to a file... (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)", "query": "process where event.type == \"start\" and event.action == \"exec\" and process.interactive == true and\nprocess.name in (\"bash\", \"dash\", \"sh\", \"tcsh\", \"csh\", \"zsh\", \"ksh\", \"fish\") and\nprocess.args in (\"-lc\", \"-c\", \"-cl\") and process.args like (\"*echo *\", \"*printf *\") and\nprocess.args like (\n \"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/etc/rc.local*\", \"*/dev/tcp/*\", \"*/etc/init.d*\", \"*/etc/update-motd.d*\",\n \"*/etc/ld.so*\", \"*/etc/sudoers*\", \"*base64 *\", \"*base32 *\", \"*base16 *\", \"*/etc/profile*\",\n \"*/dev/shm/*\", \"*/etc/ssh*\", \"*/home/*/.ssh/*\", \"*/root/.ssh*\" , \"*~/.ssh/*\", \"*xxd *\",\n \"*/etc/shadow*\", \"* /tmp/*\", \"* /var/tmp/*\", \"* /dev/shm/* \", \"* ~/*\", \"* /home/*\",\n \"* /run/*\", \"* /var/run/*\", \"*|*sh\", \"*|*python*\", \"*|*php*\", \"*|*perl*\", \"*|*busybox*\",\n \"*/var/www/*\", \"*>*\", \"*;*\", \"*chmod *\", \"*rm *\", \"*openssl enc*\"\n) and container.id like \"?*\"" }, { "name": "986361cd-3dac-47fe-afa1-5c5dd89f2fb4 — Suspicious Execution from Foomatic-rip or Cupsd Parent", "description": "(EQL) This detection rule addresses multiple vulnerabilities in the CUPS printing system, including CVE-2024-47176, CVE-2024-47076, CVE-2024-47175, and CVE-2024-47177. Specifically, this rule detects suspicious process command lines executed by child processes of foomatic-rip and cupsd... (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)", "query": "process where host.os.type == \"linux\" and event.type == \"start\" and event.action in (\"exec\", \"exec_event\", \"start\", \"ProcessRollup2\") and\nprocess.parent.name in (\"foomatic-rip\", \"cupsd\") and process.command_line like (\n // persistence\n \"*cron*\", \"*/etc/rc.local*\", \"*/dev/tcp/*\", \"*/etc/init.d*\", \"*/etc/update-motd.d*\", \"*/etc/sudoers*\",\n \"*/etc/profile*\", \"*autostart*\", \"*/etc/ssh*\", \"*/home/*/.ssh/*\", \"*/root/.ssh*\", \"*~/.ssh/*\", \"*udev*\",\n \"*/etc/shadow*\", \"*/etc/passwd*\",\n\n // Downloads\n \"*curl*\", \"*wget*\",\n\n // encoding and decoding\n \"*base64 *\", \"*base32 *\", \"*xxd *\", \"*openssl*\",\n\n // reverse connections\n \"*GS_ARGS=*\", \"*/dev/tcp*\", \"*/dev/udp/*\", \"*import*pty*spawn*\", \"*import*subprocess*call*\", \"*TCPSocket.new*\",\n \"*TCPSocket.open*\", \"*io.popen*\", \"*os.execute*\", \"*fsockopen*\", \"*disown*\", \"*nohup*\",\n\n // SO loads\n \"*openssl*-engine*.so*\", \"*cdll.LoadLibrary*.so*\", \"*ruby*-e**Fiddle.dlopen*.so*\", \"*Fiddle.dlopen*.so*\",\n \"*cdll.LoadLibrary*.so*\",\n\n // misc. suspicious command lines\n \"*/etc/ld.so*\", \"*/dev/shm/*\", \"*/var/tmp*\", \"*echo*\", \"*>>*\", \"*|*\"\n) and not process.args like \"gs*\"" } ] }, "automation": { "safe": [ "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.", "Run enrichment queries.", "Create ServiceNow SecOps task." ], "approval_required": [ "Contain or disable the affected host/account.", "Any change to production configuration." ] }, "escalation_criteria": [ "Scheduled Task/Job activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.", "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.", "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent." ], "false_positive_considerations": [ "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.", "Approved security testing or red team exercise.", "Known benign software producing similar telemetry." ], "confluence": { "title": "T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job Response Guidance", "labels": [ "mitre", "attack", "d3fend", "secops", "basyrix" ], "sections": [ "summary", "d3fend_mappings", "investigation_steps", "response_actions", "queries", "automation", "escalation_criteria", "false_positive_considerations" ] } }