{
  "technique_id": "T1207",
  "name": "Rogue Domain Controller",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Defense Impairment"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Rogue Domain Controller activity in the context of Defense Impairment: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-UGLPA",
      "name": "User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-SCP",
      "name": "System Configuration Permissions",
      "relationship": "harden",
      "practical_action": "Apply System Configuration Permissions to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-NTF",
      "name": "Network Traffic Filtering",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply Network Traffic Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Sentinel",
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-RD",
      "name": "Restore Database",
      "relationship": "restore",
      "practical_action": "Use Restore Database to recover affected systems or data after containment.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed rogue domain controller activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"Alsid DCShadow\" -- Searches for DCShadow attacks'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "25e0b2dd-3ad3-4d5b-80dd-720f4ef0f12c — Alsid DCShadow",
        "description": "Searches for DCShadow attacks' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "afad_parser\n| where MessageType == 2 and Codename == \"DCShadow\"\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Host, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(Host, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))"
      },
      {
        "name": "1a6d0a49-64b3-4ca1-96c3-f154c16c218c — Semperis DSP Mimikatz's DCShadow Alert",
        "description": "Mimikatz's DCShadow switch allows a user who has compromised an AD domain, to inject arbitrary changes into AD using a \"fake\" domain controller. These changes bypass the security event log and can't be spotted using normal AD tools. This rule looks for evidence that a machine has been used in this capacity.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "dsp_parser\n| where EventID == 9212\n| where SecurityIndicatorName == \"Evidence of Mimikatz DCShadow attack\"\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))"
      },
      {
        "name": "874e3530-552e-437b-ba2e-227979e7e43c — TIE DCShadow",
        "description": "Searches for DCShadow attacks.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "// For the query to work properly, make sure you have imported the afad_parser.yaml parser into the workspace\n// Retrieve the parser here: https://aka.ms/sentinel-TenableApp-afad-parser\n// Then, create the Kusto Function with alias afad_parser\nafad_parser\n  | where MessageType == 2 and Codename == \"DCShadow\"\n  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Host, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(Host, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": []
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Rogue Domain Controller activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1207 - Rogue Domain Controller Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}