T1010 — Application Window Discovery

# T1010 - Application Window Discovery

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Application Window Discovery activity in the context of Discovery: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| System Call Analysis | Detect | Monitor for System Call Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| System Call Filtering | Isolate | Apply System Call Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents 
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~('mobsync.exe','explorer.exe')
| where (FileName =~ 'net.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('view','/all'))
     or (FileName =~ 'whoami.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has '/all')
     or (FileName =~ 'nslookup.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('querytype=ALL','timeout=10'))
     or (FileName =~ 'netstat.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has '-nao')
     or (FileName =~ 'arp.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has '-a')
     or (FileName =~ 'ping.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has '-t' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine endswith '127.0.0.1')
| summarize DiscoveryCommands = dcount(InitiatingProcessCommandLine), make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName), make_set(FileName), make_set(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) by DeviceId, DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)   
| where DiscoveryCommands >= 3
| extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)
| extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), "")
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Application Window Discovery activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1010.json
• /api/recommendations/T1010.json
• /api/d3fend/T1010.json
• /api/mappings/T1010.json
• /api/confluence/T1010.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1010.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1010",
  "name": "Application Window Discovery",
  "priority": "medium",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used. For example, information about application windows could be used identify potential data to collect as well as identifying security tooling ([Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001)) to evade. Adversaries typically abuse system features for this type of enumeration...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Application Window Discovery activity in the context of Discovery: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-SCA",
      "name": "System Call Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for System Call Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-SCF",
      "name": "System Call Filtering",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply System Call Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed application window discovery activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"Qakbot Discovery Activies\" -- This query searches for injected processes launching discovery activity. Qakbot has been observed leading to ransomware in numerous instances. It looks for discovery commands such as net.exe, whoami.exe, nslookup.exe, netstat.exe, arp.exe, and ping.exe."
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "ba9db6b2-3d05-42ae-8aee-3a15bbe29f27 — Qakbot Discovery Activies",
        "description": "This query searches for injected processes launching discovery activity. Qakbot has been observed leading to ransomware in numerous instances. It looks for discovery commands such as net.exe, whoami.exe, nslookup.exe, netstat.exe, arp.exe, and ping.exe. (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~('mobsync.exe','explorer.exe')\n| where (FileName =~ 'net.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('view','/all'))\n     or (FileName =~ 'whoami.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has '/all')\n     or (FileName =~ 'nslookup.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('querytype=ALL','timeout=10'))\n     or (FileName =~ 'netstat.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has '-nao')\n     or (FileName =~ 'arp.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has '-a')\n     or (FileName =~ 'ping.exe' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has '-t' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine endswith '127.0.0.1')\n| summarize DiscoveryCommands = dcount(InitiatingProcessCommandLine), make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName), make_set(FileName), make_set(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) by DeviceId, DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)   \n| where DiscoveryCommands >= 3\n| extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)\n| extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), \"\")"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": []
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Application Window Discovery activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1010 - Application Window Discovery Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}