T1011 — Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium

# T1011 - Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium activity in the context of Exfiltration: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis | Detect | Monitor for User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| Network Traffic Filtering | Isolate | Apply Network Traffic Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
ASimNetworkSessionSonicWallFirewall(false)
| where NetworkDirection == "Inbound" and EventResult in ("NA", "Success")
| where EventOriginalType != 1370
| where SrcAppName contains "Windows Remote Desktop Services"
    or SrcAppName contains "Telnet"
    or (SrcAppName contains "SSH Protocol" and ThreatId != 446) // Filters out SSH server responses.
    or SrcAppName contains "Bitvise SSH"
    or DstPortNumber in (22, 23, 3389)
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1011.json
• /api/recommendations/T1011.json
• /api/d3fend/T1011.json
• /api/mappings/T1011.json
• /api/confluence/T1011.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1011.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1011",
  "name": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium",
  "priority": "medium",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium activity in the context of Exfiltration: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-UGLPA",
      "name": "User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-NTF",
      "name": "Network Traffic Filtering",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply Network Traffic Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Sentinel",
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed exfiltration over other network medium activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"SonicWall - Allowed SSH, Telnet, and RDP Connections\" -- This rule identifies allowed inbound SSH, Telnet, and RDP connections. This analytic rule leverages the SonicWall Firewall ASIM Network Session parser (ASimNetworkSessionSonicWallFirewall).'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "27f1a570-5f20-496b-88f6-a9aa2c5c9534 — SonicWall - Allowed SSH, Telnet, and RDP Connections",
        "description": "This rule identifies allowed inbound SSH, Telnet, and RDP connections. This analytic rule leverages the SonicWall Firewall ASIM Network Session parser (ASimNetworkSessionSonicWallFirewall).' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "ASimNetworkSessionSonicWallFirewall(false)\n| where NetworkDirection == \"Inbound\" and EventResult in (\"NA\", \"Success\")\n| where EventOriginalType != 1370\n| where SrcAppName contains \"Windows Remote Desktop Services\"\n    or SrcAppName contains \"Telnet\"\n    or (SrcAppName contains \"SSH Protocol\" and ThreatId != 446) // Filters out SSH server responses.\n    or SrcAppName contains \"Bitvise SSH\"\n    or DstPortNumber in (22, 23, 3389)"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": []
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1011 - Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}