T1014 — Rootkit

# T1014 - Rootkit

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Rootkit activity in the context of Stealth: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| File Analysis | Detect | Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| File Encryption | Harden | Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| File Eviction | Evict | Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. |
| Content Filtering | Isolate | Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ActionType has "<tune to T1014>"
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Rootkit activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1014.json
• /api/recommendations/T1014.json
• /api/d3fend/T1014.json
• /api/mappings/T1014.json
• /api/confluence/T1014.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1014.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1014",
  "name": "Rootkit",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Stealth"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Rootkit activity in the context of Stealth: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-FA",
      "name": "File Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-FE",
      "name": "File Encryption",
      "relationship": "harden",
      "practical_action": "Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-FEV",
      "name": "File Eviction",
      "relationship": "evict",
      "practical_action": "Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-CF",
      "name": "Content Filtering",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed rootkit activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"Unusual Kill Signal\" -- This rule detects the use of unusual kill signals, specifically kill signals in the range of 32-64, which are not commonly used in standard operations. Rootkits may leverage these signals to conduct certain actions, such as manipulating processes in unexpected ways, potentially escalating privileges or evading detection."
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "Starting point for T1014",
        "description": "Generic starting query -- tune to the specific data source relevant to this technique.",
        "query": "DeviceEvents\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)\n| where ActionType has \"<tune to T1014>\""
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "cf307a5a-d503-44a4-8158-db196d99c9df — Unusual Kill Signal",
        "description": "(EQL) This rule detects the use of unusual kill signals, specifically kill signals in the range of 32-64, which are not commonly used in standard operations. Rootkits may leverage these signals to conduct certain actions, such as manipulating processes in unexpected ways, potentially escalating privileges or evading detection. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "process where host.os.type == \"linux\" and event.action == \"killed-pid\" and auditd.data.syscall == \"kill\" and\nauditd.data.a1 in (\n  \"21\", \"22\", \"23\", \"24\", \"25\", \"26\", \"27\", \"28\", \"29\", \"2a\", \"2b\", \"2c\", \"2d\", \"2e\", \"2f\", \"30\",\n  \"31\", \"32\", \"33\", \"34\", \"35\", \"36\", \"37\", \"38\", \"39\", \"3a\", \"3b\", \"3c\", \"3d\", \"3e\", \"3f\", \"40\",\n  \"41\", \"42\", \"43\", \"44\", \"45\", \"46\", \"47\"\n)"
      },
      {
        "name": "d54b649d-46d0-4b4c-a9a7-1bc9fc458d3c — Kernel Module Load from Unusual Location",
        "description": "(EQL) This rule detects the loading of a kernel module from an unusual location. Threat actors may use this technique to maintain persistence on a system by loading a kernel module into the kernel namespace. This behavior is strongly related to the presence of a rootkit on the system. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "process where host.os.type == \"linux\" and event.type == \"start\" and event.action == \"exec\" and (\n  (process.name == \"kmod\" and process.args == \"insmod\" and process.args like~ \"*.ko*\") or\n  (process.name == \"kmod\" and process.args == \"modprobe\" and not process.args in (\"-r\", \"--remove\")) or\n  (process.name == \"insmod\" and process.args like~ \"*.ko*\") or\n  (process.name == \"modprobe\" and not process.args in (\"-r\", \"--remove\"))\n) and (\n  process.working_directory like (\n    \"/tmp*\", \"/var/tmp*\", \"/dev/shm*\", \"/run*\", \"/var/run*\", \"/home*/*\", \"/root*\",\n    \"/var/www*\", \"/boot*\", \"/srv*\", \"/mnt*\", \"/media*\"\n  ) or\n  process.parent.working_directory like (\n    \"/tmp*\", \"/var/tmp*\", \"/dev/shm*\", \"/run*\", \"/var/run*\", \"/home*/*\", \"/root*\",\n    \"/var/www*\", \"/boot*\", \"/srv*\", \"/mnt*\", \"/media*\"\n  ) or\n  process.args like (\n    \"/tmp/*\", \"/var/tmp/*\", \"/dev/shm/*\", \"/run/*\", \"/var/run/*\", \"/home/*/*\", \"/root/*\",\n    \"/var/www/*\", \"/boot/*\", \"/srv/*\", \"/mnt/*\", \"/media/*\", \"./*\"\n  )\n) and\nnot (\n  process.parent.executable == \"/usr/bin/podman\" or\n  process.working_directory like \"/tmp/newroot\"\n)"
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Rootkit activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1014 - Rootkit Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}