T1025 — Data from Removable Media

# T1025 - Data from Removable Media

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Data from Removable Media activity in the context of Collection: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Radiation Hardening | Harden | Apply Radiation Hardening to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| IO Port Restriction | Isolate | Apply IO Port Restriction to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |
| Hardware Component Inventory | Model | Use Hardware Component Inventory to establish a baseline that makes this technique's deviations easier to spot. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
secRMM_CL | where Event_s == "ONLINE" | 
extend AccountCustomEntity = User_s |
extend HostCustomEntity = Computer
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Data from Removable Media activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1025.json
• /api/recommendations/T1025.json
• /api/d3fend/T1025.json
• /api/mappings/T1025.json
• /api/confluence/T1025.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1025.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1025",
  "name": "Data from Removable Media",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Collection"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Data from Removable Media activity in the context of Collection: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-RH",
      "name": "Radiation Hardening",
      "relationship": "harden",
      "practical_action": "Apply Radiation Hardening to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-IOPR",
      "name": "IO Port Restriction",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply IO Port Restriction to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-HCI",
      "name": "Hardware Component Inventory",
      "relationship": "model",
      "practical_action": "Use Hardware Component Inventory to establish a baseline that makes this technique's deviations easier to spot.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed data from removable media activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"Removable storage ONLINE event from secRMM\" -- Detect when a removable storage device is plugged in by the end-user."
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "A22B2ECF-1478-4400-877E-07A32E53A897 — Removable storage ONLINE event from secRMM",
        "description": "Detect when a removable storage device is plugged in by the end-user. (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "secRMM_CL | where Event_s == \"ONLINE\" | \nextend AccountCustomEntity = User_s |\nextend HostCustomEntity = Computer"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": []
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Data from Removable Media activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1025 - Data from Removable Media Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}