T1029 — Scheduled Transfer

# T1029 - Scheduled Transfer

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Scheduled Transfer activity in the context of Exfiltration: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis | Detect | Monitor for User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| Network Traffic Filtering | Isolate | Apply Network Traffic Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
OracleDatabaseAuditEvent
| where isnotempty(SrcIpAddr)
| where isnotempty(Action)
| where DbAction =~ 'connect'
| where ipv4_is_private(SrcIpAddr) == 'false'
| extend AccountCustomEntity = DstUserName
| extend IPCustomEntity = SrcIpAddr
```
```kql
let lookback = 2d;
let minFlows = 10;
let beaconPercentThreshold = 80.0;
Tailscale_Network_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where HasVirtualTraffic
| mv-expand t = VirtualTraffic
| extend Src = tostring(t.src), Dst = tostring(t.dst), Proto = toint(t.proto)
| project TimeGenerated, Src, Dst, Proto, SrcNodeName, SrcUser, DstNodeName, DstUser
| sort by Src asc, Dst asc, Proto asc, TimeGenerated asc
| serialize
| extend NextTime = next(TimeGenerated), NextSrc = next(Src), NextDst = next(Dst), NextProto = next(Proto)
| where Src == NextSrc and Dst == NextDst and Proto == NextProto
| extend DeltaSec = datetime_diff('second', NextTime, TimeGenerated)
| where DeltaSec > 5
| summarize DeltaCount = count() by Src, Dst, Proto, DeltaSec, SrcNodeName, SrcUser, DstNodeName, DstUser
| summarize (MostFrequentDeltaCount, MostFrequentDeltaSec) = arg_max(DeltaCount, DeltaSec), TotalFlows = sum(DeltaCount) by Src, Dst, Proto, SrcNodeName, SrcUser, DstNodeName, DstUser
| where TotalFlows >= minFlows
| extend BeaconPercent = round(MostFrequentDeltaCount * 100.0 / TotalFlows, 1)
| where BeaconPercent >= beaconPercentThreshold
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Scheduled Transfer activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1029.json
• /api/recommendations/T1029.json
• /api/d3fend/T1029.json
• /api/mappings/T1029.json
• /api/confluence/T1029.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1029.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1029",
  "name": "Scheduled Transfer",
  "priority": "medium",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Scheduled Transfer activity in the context of Exfiltration: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-UGLPA",
      "name": "User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-NTF",
      "name": "Network Traffic Filtering",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply Network Traffic Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Sentinel",
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed scheduled transfer activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"OracleDBAudit - Connection to database from external IP\" -- Detects when connection to database is from external IP source.'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "54aa2c17-acfd-4e3a-a1c4-99c88cf34ebe — OracleDBAudit - Connection to database from external IP",
        "description": "Detects when connection to database is from external IP source.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "OracleDatabaseAuditEvent\n| where isnotempty(SrcIpAddr)\n| where isnotempty(Action)\n| where DbAction =~ 'connect'\n| where ipv4_is_private(SrcIpAddr) == 'false'\n| extend AccountCustomEntity = DstUserName\n| extend IPCustomEntity = SrcIpAddr"
      },
      {
        "name": "e3f4a5b6-3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d1e2f3a4b — Tailscale Premium: Network flow beaconing detected",
        "description": "Identifies when flows between a src-dst pair recur at a regular interval (80%+ of inter-flow gaps cluster on the same delta over 10+ flows). Signature of C2 beaconing or scheduled exfiltration. Requires Tailscale Premium or Enterprise. (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let lookback = 2d;\nlet minFlows = 10;\nlet beaconPercentThreshold = 80.0;\nTailscale_Network_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)\n| where HasVirtualTraffic\n| mv-expand t = VirtualTraffic\n| extend Src = tostring(t.src), Dst = tostring(t.dst), Proto = toint(t.proto)\n| project TimeGenerated, Src, Dst, Proto, SrcNodeName, SrcUser, DstNodeName, DstUser\n| sort by Src asc, Dst asc, Proto asc, TimeGenerated asc\n| serialize\n| extend NextTime = next(TimeGenerated), NextSrc = next(Src), NextDst = next(Dst), NextProto = next(Proto)\n| where Src == NextSrc and Dst == NextDst and Proto == NextProto\n| extend DeltaSec = datetime_diff('second', NextTime, TimeGenerated)\n| where DeltaSec > 5\n| summarize DeltaCount = count() by Src, Dst, Proto, DeltaSec, SrcNodeName, SrcUser, DstNodeName, DstUser\n| summarize (MostFrequentDeltaCount, MostFrequentDeltaSec) = arg_max(DeltaCount, DeltaSec), TotalFlows = sum(DeltaCount) by Src, Dst, Proto, SrcNodeName, SrcUser, DstNodeName, DstUser\n| where TotalFlows >= minFlows\n| extend BeaconPercent = round(MostFrequentDeltaCount * 100.0 / TotalFlows, 1)\n| where BeaconPercent >= beaconPercentThreshold"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": []
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Scheduled Transfer activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1029 - Scheduled Transfer Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}