T1057 — Process Discovery

# T1057 - Process Discovery

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Process Discovery activity in the context of Discovery: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| System Call Analysis | Detect | Monitor for System Call Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| System Call Filtering | Isolate | Apply System Call Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
// File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware
let timeFrame = 5m;
CyfirmaIndicators_CL 
| where ConfidenceScore >= 80
    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
    and pattern contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains "Malware")
| extend MD5 = extract(@"file:hashes\.md5\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{32})'", 1, pattern)
| extend SHA1 = extract(@"file:hashes\.'SHA-1'\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{40})'", 1, pattern)
| extend SHA256 = extract(@"file:hashes\.'SHA-256'\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{64})'", 1, pattern)
| extend
    Algo_MD5='md5',
    Algo_SHA1= 'SHA1',
    Algo_SHA256='SHA256',
    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',
    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'
| project  
    MD5,
    Algo_MD5,
    SHA1,
    Algo_SHA1,
    SHA256,
    Algo_SHA256,
    ThreatActors,
    Sources,
    RecommendedActions,
    Roles,
    Country,
    name,
    Description,
    ConfidenceScore,
    SecurityVendors,
    IndicatorID,
    created,
    modified,
    valid_from,
    Tags,
    ThreatType,
    TimeGenerated,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName
```
```kql
Lookout_CL
| where details_action_s == 'DETECTED' and type_s == 'THREAT'
| extend DetailsPackageName = details_packageName_s
| extend TargetPlatform = target_platform_s
| extend TargetOsVersion = target_osVersion_s
| extend Type = type_s
| extend Severity = details_severity_s
| extend Classifications = details_classifications_s
| extend Platform = target_platform_s
```
```kql
let regexEmpire = tostring(toscalar(externaldata(cmdlets:string)[@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/EmpireCommandString.txt"] with (format="txt")));
(union isfuzzy=true
 (SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
//consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur
//where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))
| where CommandLine has "-encodedCommand"
| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * "-EncodedCommand " encodedCommand
| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has " ", tostring(split(encodedCommand, " ")[0]), encodedCommand)
// Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8
| extend decodedCommand = translate('\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)
| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)
| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire
| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName
| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')
),
(WindowsEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where EventData has_any ("-encodedCommand", "powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where not(EventData has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))
//consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur
//extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
//extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
//FileName = Process
//where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe")
| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)
| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))
| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
| where CommandLine has "-encodedCommand"
| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * "-EncodedCommand " encodedCommand
| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has " ", tostring(split(encodedCommand, " ")[0]), encodedCommand)
// Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8
| extend decodedCommand = translate('\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)
| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)
| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire
| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName
| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')
))
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Process Discovery activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1057.json
• /api/recommendations/T1057.json
• /api/d3fend/T1057.json
• /api/mappings/T1057.json
• /api/confluence/T1057.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1057.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1057",
  "name": "Process Discovery",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "ESXi",
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Network Devices",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Process Discovery activity in the context of Discovery: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-SCA",
      "name": "System Call Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for System Call Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-SCF",
      "name": "System Call Filtering",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply System Call Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed process discovery activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"CYFIRMA - High severity File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware\" -- \"This KQL query retrieves file hash indicators (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) from the CyfirmaIndicators_CL table within the last 5 minutes. It filters records with a confidence score of 80 or higher, containing file hash patterns, a recommended action of 'Block', and roles marked as 'Malware'. Extracted hashes and key threat intelligence details are projected for Blocking and investigation.\""
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "990fc0dc-e7a5-4f6d-bc24-8569652cd773 — CYFIRMA - High severity File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware",
        "description": "\"This KQL query retrieves file hash indicators (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) from the CyfirmaIndicators_CL table within the last 5 minutes. It filters records with a confidence score of 80 or higher, containing file hash patterns, a recommended action of 'Block', and roles marked as 'Malware'. Extracted hashes and key threat intelligence details are projected for Blocking and investigation.\" (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "// File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware\nlet timeFrame = 5m;\nCyfirmaIndicators_CL \n| where ConfidenceScore >= 80\n    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())\n    and pattern contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains \"Malware\")\n| extend MD5 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.md5\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{32})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend SHA1 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.'SHA-1'\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{40})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend SHA256 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.'SHA-256'\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{64})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend\n    Algo_MD5='md5',\n    Algo_SHA1= 'SHA1',\n    Algo_SHA256='SHA256',\n    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',\n    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'\n| project  \n    MD5,\n    Algo_MD5,\n    SHA1,\n    Algo_SHA1,\n    SHA256,\n    Algo_SHA256,\n    ThreatActors,\n    Sources,\n    RecommendedActions,\n    Roles,\n    Country,\n    name,\n    Description,\n    ConfidenceScore,\n    SecurityVendors,\n    IndicatorID,\n    created,\n    modified,\n    valid_from,\n    Tags,\n    ThreatType,\n    TimeGenerated,\n    ProductName,\n    ProviderName"
      },
      {
        "name": "7593cc60-e294-402d-9202-279fb3c7d55f — Lookout - New Threat events found.",
        "description": "Created to detect new Threat events from the data which is recently synced by Lookout Solution.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "Lookout_CL\n| where details_action_s == 'DETECTED' and type_s == 'THREAT'\n| extend DetailsPackageName = details_packageName_s\n| extend TargetPlatform = target_platform_s\n| extend TargetOsVersion = target_osVersion_s\n| extend Type = type_s\n| extend Severity = details_severity_s\n| extend Classifications = details_classifications_s\n| extend Platform = target_platform_s"
      },
      {
        "name": "ef88eb96-861c-43a0-ab16-f3835a97c928 — Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command Line",
        "description": "This query identifies use of PowerShell Empire's cmdlets within the command line data of the PowerShell process, indicating potential use of the post-exploitation tool.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let regexEmpire = tostring(toscalar(externaldata(cmdlets:string)[@\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/EmpireCommandString.txt\"] with (format=\"txt\")));\n(union isfuzzy=true\n (SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4688\n//consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur\n//where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\",\"powershell_ise.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\")\n| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))\n| where CommandLine has \"-encodedCommand\"\n| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * \"-EncodedCommand \" encodedCommand\n| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has \" \", tostring(split(encodedCommand, \" \")[0]), encodedCommand)\n// Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8\n| extend decodedCommand = translate('\\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)\n| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)\n| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire\n| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName\n| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')\n),\n(WindowsEvent\n| where EventID == 4688\n| where EventData has_any (\"-encodedCommand\", \"powershell.exe\",\"powershell_ise.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\")\n| where not(EventData has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))\n//consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur\n//extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)\n//extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\\\')[-1])\n//FileName = Process\n//where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\",\"powershell_ise.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\")\n| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)\n| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))\n| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)\n| where CommandLine has \"-encodedCommand\"\n| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * \"-EncodedCommand \" encodedCommand\n| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has \" \", tostring(split(encodedCommand, \" \")[0]), encodedCommand)\n// Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8\n| extend decodedCommand = translate('\\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)\n| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)\n| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire\n| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)\n| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)\n| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)\n| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\\\')[-1])\n| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName\n| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')\n))"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "ef100a2e-ecd4-4f72-9d1e-2f779ff3c311 — Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Proc Filesystem",
        "description": "(EQL) Identifies the execution of the mimipenguin exploit script which is linux adaptation of Windows tool mimikatz. Mimipenguin exploit script is used to dump clear text passwords from a currently logged-in user. The tool exploits a known vulnerability CVE-2018-20781... (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "sequence by host.id, process.parent.name with maxspan=1m\n  [process where host.os.type == \"linux\" and process.name == \"ps\" and event.action in (\"exec\", \"start\", \"exec_event\")\n   and process.args in (\"-eo\", \"pid\", \"command\")]\n  [process where host.os.type == \"linux\" and process.name == \"strings\" and event.action in (\"exec\", \"start\", \"exec_event\")\n   and process.args : \"/tmp/*\"]"
      },
      {
        "name": "0369e8a6-0fa7-4e7a-961a-53180a4c966e — Suspicious Dynamic Linker Discovery via od",
        "description": "(EQL) Monitors for dynamic linker discovery via the od utility. od (octal dump) is a command-line utility in Unix operating systems used for displaying data in various formats, including octal, hexadecimal, decimal, and ASCII, primarily used for examining and debugging binary files or data streams... (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "process where host.os.type == \"linux\" and event.type == \"start\" and event.action in (\"exec\", \"exec_event\", \"start\", \"ProcessRollup2\", \"executed\", \"process_started\")\n and process.name == \"od\" and process.args in (\n  \"/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2\", \"/etc/ld.so.preload\", \"/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2\",\n  \"/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2\", \"/usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2\"\n)"
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Process Discovery activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1057 - Process Discovery Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}