T1082 — System Information Discovery

# T1082 - System Information Discovery

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate System Information Discovery activity in the context of Discovery: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| System Call Analysis | Detect | Monitor for System Call Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| System Call Filtering | Isolate | Apply System Call Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |
| Decoy Environment | Deceive | Deploy Decoy Environment to detect and mislead an adversary attempting this technique. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
ClarotyEvent
| where EventOriginalType has 'New Asset' or EventType has 'New Asset'
| extend IPCustomEntity = SrcIpAddr
| extend AlertTitle = strcat('Claroty new asset detected from ', coalesce(SrcIpAddr, 'unknown source'))
| extend AlertDescription = strcat('Claroty reported a new asset event from source IP ', coalesce(SrcIpAddr, 'unknown'), '.')
| project IPCustomEntity, AlertTitle, AlertDescription
```
```kql
// File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware
let timeFrame = 5m;
CyfirmaIndicators_CL 
| where ConfidenceScore >= 80
    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
    and pattern contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains "Malware")
| extend MD5 = extract(@"file:hashes\.md5\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{32})'", 1, pattern)
| extend SHA1 = extract(@"file:hashes\.'SHA-1'\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{40})'", 1, pattern)
| extend SHA256 = extract(@"file:hashes\.'SHA-256'\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{64})'", 1, pattern)
| extend
    Algo_MD5='md5',
    Algo_SHA1= 'SHA1',
    Algo_SHA256='SHA256',
    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',
    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'
| project  
    MD5,
    Algo_MD5,
    SHA1,
    Algo_SHA1,
    SHA256,
    Algo_SHA256,
    ThreatActors,
    Sources,
    RecommendedActions,
    Roles,
    Country,
    name,
    Description,
    ConfidenceScore,
    SecurityVendors,
    IndicatorID,
    created,
    modified,
    valid_from,
    Tags,
    ThreatType,
    TimeGenerated,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName
```
```kql
// High severity - Social and Public Exposure - Source Code Exposure on Public Repositories
let timeFrame = 5m;
CyfirmaSPESourceCodeAlerts_CL
| where severity == 'Critical' and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
| extend
    Description=description,
    FirstSeen=first_seen,
    LastSeen=last_seen,
    RiskScore=risk_score,
    AlertUID=alert_uid,
    UID=uid,
    AssetType=asset_type,
    AssetValue=signature,
    Source=source,
    Impact=impact,
    Recommendation=recommendation,
    ProviderName='CYFIRMA',
    ProductName='DeCYFIR/DeTCT',
    AlertTitle=Alert_title
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    Description,
    RiskScore,
    FirstSeen,
    LastSeen,
    AlertUID,
    UID,
    AssetType,
    AssetValue,
    Impact,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName,
    AlertTitle
```

## Escalation Criteria
- System Information Discovery activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1082.json
• /api/recommendations/T1082.json
• /api/d3fend/T1082.json
• /api/mappings/T1082.json
• /api/confluence/T1082.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1082.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1082",
  "name": "System Information Discovery",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "ESXi",
    "IaaS",
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Network Devices",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate System Information Discovery activity in the context of Discovery: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-SCA",
      "name": "System Call Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for System Call Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-SCF",
      "name": "System Call Filtering",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply System Call Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-DE",
      "name": "Decoy Environment",
      "relationship": "deceive",
      "practical_action": "Deploy Decoy Environment to detect and mislead an adversary attempting this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed system information discovery activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"Claroty - New Asset\" -- Triggers when Claroty reports a new asset event in the environment, indicating that a previously unseen device or system has been discovered and should be reviewed for authorization, ownership, and expected network placement.'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "6c29b611-ce69-4016-bf99-eca639fee1f5 — Claroty - New Asset",
        "description": "Triggers when Claroty reports a new asset event in the environment, indicating that a previously unseen device or system has been discovered and should be reviewed for authorization, ownership, and expected network placement.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "ClarotyEvent\n| where EventOriginalType has 'New Asset' or EventType has 'New Asset'\n| extend IPCustomEntity = SrcIpAddr\n| extend AlertTitle = strcat('Claroty new asset detected from ', coalesce(SrcIpAddr, 'unknown source'))\n| extend AlertDescription = strcat('Claroty reported a new asset event from source IP ', coalesce(SrcIpAddr, 'unknown'), '.')\n| project IPCustomEntity, AlertTitle, AlertDescription"
      },
      {
        "name": "990fc0dc-e7a5-4f6d-bc24-8569652cd773 — CYFIRMA - High severity File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware",
        "description": "\"This KQL query retrieves file hash indicators (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) from the CyfirmaIndicators_CL table within the last 5 minutes. It filters records with a confidence score of 80 or higher, containing file hash patterns, a recommended action of 'Block', and roles marked as 'Malware'. Extracted hashes and key threat intelligence details are projected for Blocking and investigation.\" (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "// File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware\nlet timeFrame = 5m;\nCyfirmaIndicators_CL \n| where ConfidenceScore >= 80\n    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())\n    and pattern contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains \"Malware\")\n| extend MD5 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.md5\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{32})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend SHA1 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.'SHA-1'\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{40})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend SHA256 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.'SHA-256'\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{64})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend\n    Algo_MD5='md5',\n    Algo_SHA1= 'SHA1',\n    Algo_SHA256='SHA256',\n    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',\n    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'\n| project  \n    MD5,\n    Algo_MD5,\n    SHA1,\n    Algo_SHA1,\n    SHA256,\n    Algo_SHA256,\n    ThreatActors,\n    Sources,\n    RecommendedActions,\n    Roles,\n    Country,\n    name,\n    Description,\n    ConfidenceScore,\n    SecurityVendors,\n    IndicatorID,\n    created,\n    modified,\n    valid_from,\n    Tags,\n    ThreatType,\n    TimeGenerated,\n    ProductName,\n    ProviderName"
      },
      {
        "name": "42e6f16a-7773-44cc-8668-8f648bd1aa4f — CYFIRMA - Social and Public Exposure - Source Code Exposure on Public Repositories Rule",
        "description": "\"This rule triggers when CYFIRMA detects source code related to internal or enterprise domains exposed on public platforms like GitHub. Such exposure may lead to intellectual property leakage or help adversaries understand internal systems, increasing the risk of targeted attacks.\" (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "// High severity - Social and Public Exposure - Source Code Exposure on Public Repositories\nlet timeFrame = 5m;\nCyfirmaSPESourceCodeAlerts_CL\n| where severity == 'Critical' and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())\n| extend\n    Description=description,\n    FirstSeen=first_seen,\n    LastSeen=last_seen,\n    RiskScore=risk_score,\n    AlertUID=alert_uid,\n    UID=uid,\n    AssetType=asset_type,\n    AssetValue=signature,\n    Source=source,\n    Impact=impact,\n    Recommendation=recommendation,\n    ProviderName='CYFIRMA',\n    ProductName='DeCYFIR/DeTCT',\n    AlertTitle=Alert_title\n| project\n    TimeGenerated,\n    Description,\n    RiskScore,\n    FirstSeen,\n    LastSeen,\n    AlertUID,\n    UID,\n    AssetType,\n    AssetValue,\n    Impact,\n    ProductName,\n    ProviderName,\n    AlertTitle"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "ae3e9625-89ad-4fc3-a7bf-fced5e64f01b — Suspicious React Server Child Process",
        "description": "(EQL) This rule detects suspicious child process activity from a React server application. This could be related to successful exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 or CVE-2025-66478... (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "process where event.type == \"start\" and event.action in (\"exec\", \"executed\", \"start\", \"process_started\") and (\n    process.name in (\n      \"sh\", \"bash\", \"zsh\", \"dash\", \"curl\", \"wget\", \"id\", \"whoami\", \"uname\", \"cmd.exe\", \"cat\", \"powershell.exe\", \"java\", \"rundll32.exe\", \"wget.exe\", \"certutil.exe\",\n      \"nc\", \"ncat\", \"netcat\", \"nc.openbsd\", \"nc.traditional\", \"socat\", \"busybox\", \"mkfifo\", \"nohup\", \"setsid\", \"xterm\"\n    ) or\n    (process.name : \"python*\" and process.args : \"-c\" and process.args : (\n     \"*import*pty*spawn*\", \"*import*subprocess*call*\"\n    )) or\n    (process.name : \"perl*\" and process.args : \"-e\" and process.args : \"*socket*\" and process.args : (\n     \"*exec*\", \"*system*\"\n    )) or\n    (process.name : \"ruby*\" and process.args : (\"-e\", \"-rsocket\") and process.args : (\n     \"*TCPSocket.new*\", \"*TCPSocket.open*\"\n     )) or\n    (process.name : \"lua*\" and process.args : \"-e\" and process.args : \"*socket.tcp*\" and process.args : (\n     \"*io.popen*\", \"*os.execute*\"\n    )) or\n    (process.name : \"php*\" and process.args : \"-r\" and process.args : \"*fsockopen*\" and process.args : \"*/bin/*sh*\") or \n    (process.name == \"node\" and process.args == \"-e\" and process.args : \"*spawn*sh*\" and process.args : \"*connect*\") or\n    (process.name : (\"awk\", \"gawk\", \"mawk\", \"nawk\") and process.args : \"*/inet/tcp/*\") or\n    (process.name in (\"rvim\", \"vim\", \"vimdiff\", \"rview\", \"view\") and process.args == \"-c\" and process.args : \"*socket*\")\n)\nand (\n  ?process.working_directory : (\n    \"*react-dom*\", \"*.next*\", \"*node_modules/next*\", \"*react-server*\", \"*bin/next*\", \"*.pnpm/next*\", \"*next/dist/server*\", \"*react-scripts*\") or\n  (\n    process.parent.name in (\"node\", \"bun\", \"node.exe\", \"bun.exe\") and\n    process.parent.command_line : (\n      \"*react-dom*\", \"*.next*\", \"*node_modules/next*\", \"*react-server*\", \"*next-server*\", \"* server.js*\",  \"*start-server.js*\", \"*bin/next*\",\n      \"*--experimental-https*\", \"*app/server*\", \"*.pnpm/next*\", \"*next start*\", \"*next dev*\", \"*react-scripts start*\", \"*next/dist/server*\"\n    )\n  )\n) and not (\n  ?process.parent.executable in (\"./runc\", \"/opt/google/chrome/chrome\") or\n  process.command_line like \"/bin/sh -c git config*\"\n)"
      },
      {
        "name": "c28750fa-4092-11f0-aca6-f661ea17fbcd — Entra ID Sign-in BloodHound Suite User-Agent Detected",
        "description": "(EQL) Identifies potential enumeration activity using AzureHound, SharpHound, or BloodHound across Microsoft cloud services. These tools are often used by red teamers and adversaries to map users, groups, roles, applications, and access relationships within Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) and Microsoft 365. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "any where data_stream.dataset : (\n    \"azure.activitylogs\",\n    \"azure.graphactivitylogs\",\n    \"azure.auditlogs\",\n    \"azure.signinlogs\",\n    \"o365.audit\"\n) and user_agent.original regex~ \"(azure|sharp|blood)(hound)/.*\""
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "System Information Discovery activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1082 - System Information Discovery Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}