T1102 — Web Service

# T1102 - Web Service

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Web Service activity in the context of Command and Control: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Relay Pattern Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Relay Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| Outbound Traffic Filtering | Isolate | Apply Outbound Traffic Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let eventsThreshold = 20;
CommonSecurityLog
| where isnotempty(RequestURL)
| project TimeGenerated, RequestURL, RequestMethod, SourceIP, SourceHostName
| evaluate sequence_detect(TimeGenerated, 5s, 8s, login=(RequestURL has "login.microsoftonline.com/consumers/oauth2/v2.0/token"), graph=(RequestURL has "graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/"), SourceIP, SourceHostName)
| summarize Events=count() by SourceIP, SourceHostName
| where Events >= eventsThreshold
```
```kql
let oneDriveCalls = dynamic(['graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/data.txt:/content','graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/response.json:/content']);
let oneDriveCallsRegex = dynamic([@'graph\.microsoft\.com\/v1\.0\/me\/drive\/root\:\/Uploaded\/.*\:\/content',@'graph\.microsoft\.com\/v1\.0\/me\/drive\/root\:\/Downloaded\/.*\:\/content']);
CommonSecurityLog
| where RequestURL has_any (oneDriveCalls) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[0]) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[1])
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct, DeviceAction, DestinationDnsDomain, DestinationIP, RequestURL, SourceIP, SourceHostName, RequestClientApplication
```
```kql
CiscoSecureEndpoint
| where EventMessage has 'Possible webshell'
| extend HostCustomEntity = DstHostname, MalwareCustomEntity = ThreatName
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Web Service activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1102.json
• /api/recommendations/T1102.json
• /api/d3fend/T1102.json
• /api/mappings/T1102.json
• /api/confluence/T1102.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1102.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1102",
  "name": "Web Service",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Command and Control"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "ESXi",
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Web Service activity in the context of Command and Control: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-RPA",
      "name": "Relay Pattern Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for Relay Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-OTF",
      "name": "Outbound Traffic Filtering",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply Outbound Traffic Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Sentinel",
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed web service activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"CreepyDrive request URL sequence\" -- CreepyDrive uses OneDrive for command and control, however, it makes regular requests to predicatable paths. This detecton will alert when over 20 sequences are observed in a single day.'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "eda260eb-f4a1-4379-ad98-452604da9b3e — CreepyDrive request URL sequence",
        "description": "CreepyDrive uses OneDrive for command and control, however, it makes regular requests to predicatable paths. This detecton will alert when over 20 sequences are observed in a single day.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed), mapped via sub-technique T1102.002.)",
        "query": "let eventsThreshold = 20;\nCommonSecurityLog\n| where isnotempty(RequestURL)\n| project TimeGenerated, RequestURL, RequestMethod, SourceIP, SourceHostName\n| evaluate sequence_detect(TimeGenerated, 5s, 8s, login=(RequestURL has \"login.microsoftonline.com/consumers/oauth2/v2.0/token\"), graph=(RequestURL has \"graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/\"), SourceIP, SourceHostName)\n| summarize Events=count() by SourceIP, SourceHostName\n| where Events >= eventsThreshold"
      },
      {
        "name": "b6d03b88-4d27-49a2-9c1c-29f1ad2842dc — CreepyDrive URLs",
        "description": "CreepyDrive uses OneDrive for command and control. This detection identifies URLs specific to CreepyDrive.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed), mapped via sub-technique T1102.002.)",
        "query": "let oneDriveCalls = dynamic(['graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/data.txt:/content','graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/response.json:/content']);\nlet oneDriveCallsRegex = dynamic([@'graph\\.microsoft\\.com\\/v1\\.0\\/me\\/drive\\/root\\:\\/Uploaded\\/.*\\:\\/content',@'graph\\.microsoft\\.com\\/v1\\.0\\/me\\/drive\\/root\\:\\/Downloaded\\/.*\\:\\/content']);\nCommonSecurityLog\n| where RequestURL has_any (oneDriveCalls) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[0]) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[1])\n| project TimeGenerated, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct, DeviceAction, DestinationDnsDomain, DestinationIP, RequestURL, SourceIP, SourceHostName, RequestClientApplication"
      },
      {
        "name": "d2c97cc9-1ccc-494d-bad4-564700451a2b — Cisco SE - Possible webshell",
        "description": "Detects possible webshell on host.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "CiscoSecureEndpoint\n| where EventMessage has 'Possible webshell'\n| extend HostCustomEntity = DstHostname, MalwareCustomEntity = ThreatName"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "05f2b649-dc03-4e9a-8c4e-6762469e8249 — Suspicious AWS S3 Connection via Script Interpreter",
        "description": "(ESQL) Detects when a script interpreter (osascript, Node.js, Python) with minimal arguments makes an outbound connection to AWS S3 or CloudFront domains. Threat actors have used S3 buckets for both command and control and data exfiltration. Script interpreters connecting to cloud storage should be investigated for potential malicious activity. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "FROM logs-endpoint.events.network-*  \n| WHERE host.os.type == \"macos\" \n    AND event.type == \"start\"  \n    AND (process.name == \"osascript\" \n            OR process.name == \"node\" \n            OR process.name LIKE \"python*\")  \n    AND (destination.domain LIKE \"s3.*.amazonaws.com\" \n            OR destination.domain LIKE \"*.s3*.amazonaws.com\" \n            OR destination.domain LIKE \"*.cloudfront.net\")  \n| STATS Esql.connection_count = COUNT(*) \n    BY process.entity_id, process.executable, user.name, host.name, destination.domain  \n| WHERE Esql.connection_count >= 20  \n| KEEP Esql.*, process.entity_id, process.executable, user.name, host.name, destination.domain"
      },
      {
        "name": "abc7a2be-479e-428b-b0b3-1d22bda46dd9 — Google Calendar C2 via Script Interpreter",
        "description": "(EQL) Detects a two-stage Google Calendar C2 pattern where a scripting runtime (Node.js, Python, osascript) first connects to calendar.app.google to retrieve a hidden C2 address, then initiates a secondary connection to the decoded C2 host. This sequence is characteristic of packages using Unicode steganography in Google Calendar events to stage dynamic command-and-control endpoints. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=20s\n  [network where host.os.type == \"macos\" and event.type == \"start\" and\n    (process.name in (\"node\", \"osascript\") or process.name like \"python*\" or\n     process.code_signature.trusted == false or process.code_signature.exists == false) and\n    destination.domain like \"calendar.app.google*\"]\n  [network where host.os.type == \"macos\" and event.type == \"start\" and destination.domain == null]"
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Web Service activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1102 - Web Service Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}