T1113 — Screen Capture

# T1113 - Screen Capture

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Screen Capture activity in the context of Collection: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| System Call Analysis | Detect | Monitor for System Call Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| System Call Filtering | Isolate | Apply System Call Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
// File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware
let timeFrame = 5m;
CyfirmaIndicators_CL 
| where ConfidenceScore >= 80
    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
    and pattern contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains "Malware")
| extend MD5 = extract(@"file:hashes\.md5\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{32})'", 1, pattern)
| extend SHA1 = extract(@"file:hashes\.'SHA-1'\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{40})'", 1, pattern)
| extend SHA256 = extract(@"file:hashes\.'SHA-256'\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{64})'", 1, pattern)
| extend
    Algo_MD5='md5',
    Algo_SHA1= 'SHA1',
    Algo_SHA256='SHA256',
    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',
    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'
| project  
    MD5,
    Algo_MD5,
    SHA1,
    Algo_SHA1,
    SHA256,
    Algo_SHA256,
    ThreatActors,
    Sources,
    RecommendedActions,
    Roles,
    Country,
    name,
    Description,
    ConfidenceScore,
    SecurityVendors,
    IndicatorID,
    created,
    modified,
    valid_from,
    Tags,
    ThreatType,
    TimeGenerated,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName
```
```kql
let regexEmpire = tostring(toscalar(externaldata(cmdlets:string)[@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/EmpireCommandString.txt"] with (format="txt")));
(union isfuzzy=true
 (SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
//consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur
//where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))
| where CommandLine has "-encodedCommand"
| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * "-EncodedCommand " encodedCommand
| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has " ", tostring(split(encodedCommand, " ")[0]), encodedCommand)
// Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8
| extend decodedCommand = translate('\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)
| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)
| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire
| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName
| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')
),
(WindowsEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where EventData has_any ("-encodedCommand", "powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where not(EventData has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))
//consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur
//extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
//extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
//FileName = Process
//where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe")
| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)
| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))
| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
| where CommandLine has "-encodedCommand"
| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * "-EncodedCommand " encodedCommand
| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has " ", tostring(split(encodedCommand, " ")[0]), encodedCommand)
// Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8
| extend decodedCommand = translate('\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)
| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)
| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire
| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName
| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')
))
```
```kql
// File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware
let timeFrame = 5m;
CyfirmaIndicators_CL 
| where  (ConfidenceScore < 80 and ConfidenceScore >= 50)
    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
    and pattern contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains "Malware")
| extend MD5 = extract(@"file:hashes\.md5\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{32})'", 1, pattern)
| extend SHA1 = extract(@"file:hashes\.'SHA-1'\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{40})'", 1, pattern)
| extend SHA256 = extract(@"file:hashes\.'SHA-256'\s*=\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{64})'", 1, pattern)
| extend
    Algo_MD5='md5',
    Algo_SHA1= 'SHA1',
    Algo_SHA256='SHA256',
    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',
    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'
| project  
    MD5,
    Algo_MD5,
    SHA1,
    Algo_SHA1,
    SHA256,
    Algo_SHA256,
    ThreatActors,
    Sources,
    RecommendedActions,
    Roles,
    Country,
    name,
    Description,
    ConfidenceScore,
    SecurityVendors,
    IndicatorID,
    created,
    modified,
    valid_from,
    Tags,
    ThreatType,
    TimeGenerated,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Screen Capture activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1113.json
• /api/recommendations/T1113.json
• /api/d3fend/T1113.json
• /api/mappings/T1113.json
• /api/confluence/T1113.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1113.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1113",
  "name": "Screen Capture",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Collection"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Screen Capture activity in the context of Collection: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-SCA",
      "name": "System Call Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for System Call Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-SCF",
      "name": "System Call Filtering",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply System Call Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed screen capture activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"CYFIRMA - High severity File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware\" -- \"This KQL query retrieves file hash indicators (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) from the CyfirmaIndicators_CL table within the last 5 minutes. It filters records with a confidence score of 80 or higher, containing file hash patterns, a recommended action of 'Block', and roles marked as 'Malware'. Extracted hashes and key threat intelligence details are projected for Blocking and investigation.\""
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "990fc0dc-e7a5-4f6d-bc24-8569652cd773 — CYFIRMA - High severity File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware",
        "description": "\"This KQL query retrieves file hash indicators (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) from the CyfirmaIndicators_CL table within the last 5 minutes. It filters records with a confidence score of 80 or higher, containing file hash patterns, a recommended action of 'Block', and roles marked as 'Malware'. Extracted hashes and key threat intelligence details are projected for Blocking and investigation.\" (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "// File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware\nlet timeFrame = 5m;\nCyfirmaIndicators_CL \n| where ConfidenceScore >= 80\n    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())\n    and pattern contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains \"Malware\")\n| extend MD5 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.md5\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{32})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend SHA1 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.'SHA-1'\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{40})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend SHA256 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.'SHA-256'\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{64})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend\n    Algo_MD5='md5',\n    Algo_SHA1= 'SHA1',\n    Algo_SHA256='SHA256',\n    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',\n    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'\n| project  \n    MD5,\n    Algo_MD5,\n    SHA1,\n    Algo_SHA1,\n    SHA256,\n    Algo_SHA256,\n    ThreatActors,\n    Sources,\n    RecommendedActions,\n    Roles,\n    Country,\n    name,\n    Description,\n    ConfidenceScore,\n    SecurityVendors,\n    IndicatorID,\n    created,\n    modified,\n    valid_from,\n    Tags,\n    ThreatType,\n    TimeGenerated,\n    ProductName,\n    ProviderName"
      },
      {
        "name": "ef88eb96-861c-43a0-ab16-f3835a97c928 — Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command Line",
        "description": "This query identifies use of PowerShell Empire's cmdlets within the command line data of the PowerShell process, indicating potential use of the post-exploitation tool.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let regexEmpire = tostring(toscalar(externaldata(cmdlets:string)[@\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/EmpireCommandString.txt\"] with (format=\"txt\")));\n(union isfuzzy=true\n (SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4688\n//consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur\n//where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\",\"powershell_ise.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\")\n| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))\n| where CommandLine has \"-encodedCommand\"\n| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * \"-EncodedCommand \" encodedCommand\n| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has \" \", tostring(split(encodedCommand, \" \")[0]), encodedCommand)\n// Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8\n| extend decodedCommand = translate('\\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)\n| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)\n| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire\n| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName\n| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')\n),\n(WindowsEvent\n| where EventID == 4688\n| where EventData has_any (\"-encodedCommand\", \"powershell.exe\",\"powershell_ise.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\")\n| where not(EventData has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))\n//consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur\n//extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)\n//extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\\\')[-1])\n//FileName = Process\n//where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\",\"powershell_ise.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\")\n| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)\n| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))\n| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)\n| where CommandLine has \"-encodedCommand\"\n| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * \"-EncodedCommand \" encodedCommand\n| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has \" \", tostring(split(encodedCommand, \" \")[0]), encodedCommand)\n// Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8\n| extend decodedCommand = translate('\\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)\n| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)\n| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire\n| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)\n| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)\n| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)\n| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\\\')[-1])\n| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName\n| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')\n))"
      },
      {
        "name": "24dcff02-123c-4e10-a531-2a22a609120a — CYFIRMA - Medium severity File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware",
        "description": "\"This KQL query retrieves file hash indicators (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) from the CyfirmaIndicators_CL table within the last 5 minutes. It filters records with a confidence score of 80 or higher, containing file hash patterns, a recommended action of 'Block', and roles marked as 'Malware'. Extracted hashes and key threat intelligence details are projected for Blocking and investigation.\" (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "// File Hash Indicators with Block Action and Malware\nlet timeFrame = 5m;\nCyfirmaIndicators_CL \n| where  (ConfidenceScore < 80 and ConfidenceScore >= 50)\n    and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())\n    and pattern contains 'file:hashes' and RecommendedActions has 'Block' and (Roles contains \"Malware\")\n| extend MD5 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.md5\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{32})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend SHA1 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.'SHA-1'\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{40})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend SHA256 = extract(@\"file:hashes\\.'SHA-256'\\s*=\\s*'([a-fA-F0-9]{64})'\", 1, pattern)\n| extend\n    Algo_MD5='md5',\n    Algo_SHA1= 'SHA1',\n    Algo_SHA256='SHA256',\n    ProviderName = 'CYFIRMA',\n    ProductName = 'DeCYFIR/DeTCT'\n| project  \n    MD5,\n    Algo_MD5,\n    SHA1,\n    Algo_SHA1,\n    SHA256,\n    Algo_SHA256,\n    ThreatActors,\n    Sources,\n    RecommendedActions,\n    Roles,\n    Country,\n    name,\n    Description,\n    ConfidenceScore,\n    SecurityVendors,\n    IndicatorID,\n    created,\n    modified,\n    valid_from,\n    Tags,\n    ThreatType,\n    TimeGenerated,\n    ProductName,\n    ProviderName"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "c57f8579-e2a5-4804-847f-f2732edc5156 — Potential Remote Desktop Shadowing Activity",
        "description": "(EQL) Identifies the modification of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Shadow registry or the execution of processes indicative of an active RDP shadowing session. An adversary may abuse the RDP Shadowing feature to spy on or control other users active RDP sessions. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "/* Identifies the modification of RDP Shadow registry or\n  the execution of processes indicative of active shadow RDP session */\n\nany where host.os.type == \"windows\" and\n(\n  (event.category == \"registry\" and event.type == \"change\" and\n    registry.value : \"Shadow\" and\n    registry.path : (\n      \"*\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\Terminal Services\\\\Shadow\"\n    ) and\n    registry.data.strings : (\"1\", \"0x00000001\", \"2\", \"0x00000002\", \"3\", \"0x00000003\", \"4\", \"0x00000004\")\n\n  ) or\n  (event.category == \"process\" and event.type == \"start\" and\n    (\n      (process.name : (\"RdpSaUacHelper.exe\", \"RdpSaProxy.exe\") and process.parent.name : \"svchost.exe\") or\n      (?process.pe.original_file_name : \"mstsc.exe\" and process.args : \"/shadow:*\")\n    )\n  )\n)"
      },
      {
        "name": "959a7353-1129-4aa7-9084-30746b256a70 — PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities",
        "description": "(KUERY) Detects PowerShell script block content that uses CopyFromScreen with .NET bitmap classes to capture screenshots. Attackers use screen capture to collect on-screen information and credentials. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and\n  powershell.file.script_block_text : (\n    CopyFromScreen and\n    (\"System.Drawing.Bitmap\" or \"Drawing.Bitmap\")\n  ) and not user.id : \"S-1-5-18\""
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Screen Capture activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1113 - Screen Capture Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}