T1123 — Audio Capture

# T1123 - Audio Capture

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Audio Capture activity in the context of Collection: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Input Device Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Input Device Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| Radiation Hardening | Harden | Apply Radiation Hardening to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| IO Port Restriction | Isolate | Apply IO Port Restriction to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |
| Hardware Component Inventory | Model | Use Hardware Component Inventory to establish a baseline that makes this technique's deviations easier to spot. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ActionType has "<tune to T1123>"
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Audio Capture activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1123.json
• /api/recommendations/T1123.json
• /api/d3fend/T1123.json
• /api/mappings/T1123.json
• /api/confluence/T1123.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1123.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1123",
  "name": "Audio Capture",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Collection"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information. Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Audio Capture activity in the context of Collection: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-IDA",
      "name": "Input Device Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for Input Device Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-RH",
      "name": "Radiation Hardening",
      "relationship": "harden",
      "practical_action": "Apply Radiation Hardening to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-IOPR",
      "name": "IO Port Restriction",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply IO Port Restriction to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-HCI",
      "name": "Hardware Component Inventory",
      "relationship": "model",
      "practical_action": "Use Hardware Component Inventory to establish a baseline that makes this technique's deviations easier to spot.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed audio capture activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities\" -- Detects PowerShell script block content that invokes microphone capture routines or WinMM audio APIs. Adversaries may use audio recording to surveil users or capture sensitive conversations for theft or extortion."
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "Starting point for T1123",
        "description": "Generic starting query -- tune to the specific data source relevant to this technique.",
        "query": "DeviceEvents\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)\n| where ActionType has \"<tune to T1123>\""
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "2f2f4939-0b34-40c2-a0a3-844eb7889f43 — PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities",
        "description": "(KUERY) Detects PowerShell script block content that invokes microphone capture routines or WinMM audio APIs. Adversaries may use audio recording to surveil users or capture sensitive conversations for theft or extortion. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and\n  powershell.file.script_block_text : (\n    \"Get-MicrophoneAudio\" or\n    (\"Get-AudioDevice\" and \"Recording\" and \"Set-AudioDevice\") or\n    \"WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet\" or\n    (\n      \"winmm.dll\" and\n      (\n        \"waveInGetNumDevs\" or \"waveInOpen\" or \"waveInStart\" or\n        \"mciSendString\" or \"mciSendStringA\" or \"mciSendStringW\"\n      )\n    )\n  ) and\n  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (\n    \"sentinelbreakpoints\" and \"Set-PSBreakpoint\" and \"PowerSploitIndicators\"\n  )"
      },
      {
        "name": "3ee526ce-1f26-45dd-9358-c23100d1121f — Linux Audio Recording Activity Detected",
        "description": "(KUERY) This rule monitors for the usage of the most common audio recording utilities on unix systems by an uncommon process parent. Adversaries may collect audio data from users or systems for a variety of reasons including espionage, credential theft, or reconnaissance. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "event.category:process and host.os.type:\"linux\" and event.type:\"start\" and event.action:(\"exec\" or \"exec_event\" or \"start\") and (\n  process.name:(\"arecord\" or \"parec\" or \"pw-record\" or \"ecasound\") or\n  (process.name:\"pw-cat\" and process.args:\"-r\") or\n  (process.name:\"ffmpeg\" and process.args:\"-i\")\n) and\nnot process.args:(\"-h\" or \"--help\" or \"--version\")"
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Audio Capture activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1123 - Audio Capture Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}