Persistence
T1137 — Office Application Startup
Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins...
Investigate Office Application Startup activity in the context of Persistence: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.
Platforms
Windows, Office Suite
Priority / status
high / draft
Evidence to collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts
D3-FA · detect
File Analysis
Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.
Tooling: Defender for Endpoint
D3-FE · harden
File Encryption
Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs.
Tooling: Defender for Endpoint
D3-FEV · evict
File Eviction
Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed.
Tooling: Defender for Endpoint
D3-CF · isolate
Content Filtering
Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.
Tooling: Defender for Endpoint
| ATT&CK Technique | D3FEND Technique | Practical SOC Action | Tooling |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1137 Office Application Startup | File Analysis | Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. | Defender for Endpoint |
| T1137 Office Application Startup | File Encryption | Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. | Defender for Endpoint |
| T1137 Office Application Startup | File Eviction | Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. | Defender for Endpoint |
| T1137 Office Application Startup | Content Filtering | Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. | Defender for Endpoint |
T1137 Office Application Startup → D3FEND → SOC action
Investigation steps — Microsoft
- Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
- Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
- Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.
Investigation steps — generic
- Confirm whether the observed office application startup activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.
- Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.
- Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.
- Real detection reference: "[Deprecated] - Aqua Blizzard Actor IOCs - Feb 2022" -- This query has been deprecated as the associated IoCs (Indicators of Compromise) are outdated and no longer relevant. To ensure effective threat detection, it is recommended to implement Microsoft's Threat Intelligence solution, which enables matching your log data with the most up-to-date IoCs generated by Microsoft. This solution can be installed from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub if not currently deployed. More details on the Content Hub can be found here: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy'
Response actions
| Action | Risk | Automation safe | Approval required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |
KQL
825991eb-ea39-4590-9de2-ee97ef42eb93 — [Deprecated] - Aqua Blizzard Actor IOCs - Feb 2022
let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ActiniumIOC.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
let domains = (iocs | where Type =~ "domainname"| project IoC);
let sha256Hashes = (iocs | where Type =~ "sha256" | project IoC);
(union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes) or SHA256 in (sha256Hashes) or (ProcessCommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and ProcessCommandLine has ('/tr "wscript.exe') and ProcessCommandLine has ('"%PUBLIC%\\Pictures\\') and ProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b" /F')) or (ProcessCommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\Users\\') and ProcessCommandLine has ('.wav') and ProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b')
or (ProcessCommandLine has_all ("schtasks.exe", "create", "wscript", "e:vbscript", ".wav")))
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type, AccountName, SHA256, FileName
| extend Account = AccountName, Computer = DeviceName, FileHash = case(InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes), "InitiatingProcessSHA256", SHA256 in (sha256Hashes), "SHA256", "No Match")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = Account, ProcessCustomEntity = FileName, FileHashCustomEntity = case(FileHash == "InitiatingProcessSHA256", InitiatingProcessSHA256, FileHash == "SHA256", SHA256, "No Match"), AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
( SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where (CommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and CommandLine has ('/tr "wscript.exe') and CommandLine has ('"%PUBLIC%\\Pictures\\') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b" /F')) or (CommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\Users\\') and CommandLine has ('.wav') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b'))
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, NewProcessName, ParentProcessName, Account, NewProcessId, Type, EventID
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = Account, ProcessCustomEntity = NewProcessName
),
( CommonSecurityLog
| where FileHash in (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, FileHash, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, FileHashCustomEntity = FileHash, Account = SourceUserID, AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
( imFileEvent
| where Hash in~ (sha256Hashes) or (ActingProcessCommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('/tr "wscript.exe') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('"%PUBLIC%\\Pictures\\') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b" /F')) or (ActingProcessCommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\Users\\') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('.wav') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b')
or (ActingProcessCommandLine has_all ("schtasks.exe", "create", "wscript", "e:vbscript", ".wav")))
| extend Account = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = Hash
| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Account, HostCustomEntity = Computer, FileHashCustomEntity = FileHash, AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
(Event
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
| extend Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"], CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].["#text"], Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].["#text"])
| extend Hashes = extract_all(@"(?P<key>\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)", dynamic(["key","value"]), Hashes)
| extend Hashes = column_ifexists("Hashes", ""), CommandLine = column_ifexists("CommandLine", "")
| extend Hashes = todynamic(Hashes) | mv-expand Hashes
| where (Hashes[0] =~ "SHA256" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)) or (CommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and CommandLine has ('/tr "wscript.exe') and CommandLine has ('"%PUBLIC%\\Pictures\\') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b" /F')) or (CommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\Users\\') and CommandLine has ('.wav') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b') or (CommandLine has_all ("schtasks.exe", "create", "wscript", "e:vbscript", ".wav")))
| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, Hashes, CommandLine, Image
| extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = UserName, ProcessCustomEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), FileHashCustomEntity = tostring(Hashes[1]), AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
(DnsEvents
| where Name in~ (domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, IPAddresses, Name, ClientIP, Type
| extend DestinationIPAddress = IPAddresses, DNSName = Name, Computer
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = DestinationIPAddress
),
(VMConnection
| where RemoteDnsCanonicalNames has_any (domains)
| parse RemoteDnsCanonicalNames with * '["' DNSName '"]' *
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Direction, ProcessName, SourceIp, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, RemoteDnsQuestions, DNSName,BytesSent, BytesReceived, RemoteCountry, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = DestinationIp, File = ProcessName
),
(AzureDiagnostics
| where ResourceType == "AZUREFIREWALLS"
| where Category == "AzureFirewallApplicationRule"
| project TimeGenerated,Resource, msg_s, Type
| parse msg_s with Protocol 'request from ' SourceHost ':' SourcePort 'to ' DestinationHost ':' DestinationPort '. Action:' Action
| where isnotempty(DestinationHost)
| where DestinationHost has_any (domains)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = DestinationHost, IPCustomEntity = SourceHost
),
(AzureDiagnostics
| where ResourceType == "AZUREFIREWALLS"
| where Category == "AzureFirewallDnsProxy"
| project TimeGenerated,Resource, msg_s, Type
| parse msg_s with "DNS Request: " ClientIP ":" ClientPort " - " QueryID " " Request_Type " " Request_Class " " Request_Name ". " Request_Protocol " " Request_Size " " EDNSO_DO " " EDNS0_Buffersize " " Responce_Code " " Responce_Flags " " Responce_Size " " Response_Duration
| where Request_Name has_any (domains)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = Request_Name, IPCustomEntity = ClientIP
),
(AZFWApplicationRule
| where isnotempty(Fqdn)
| where Fqdn has_any (domains)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = Fqdn, IPCustomEntity = SourceIp
),
(AZFWDnsQuery
| where isnotempty(QueryName)
| where QueryName has_any (domains)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = QueryName, IPCustomEntity = SourceIp
),
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| where RemoteUrl in~ (domains)
| project Type, TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = DeviceName , AccountCustomEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, DNSName = RemoteUrl, IPCustomEntity = RemoteIP
)
)18dbdc22-b69f-4109-9e39-723d9465f45f — Aqua Blizzard AV hits - Feb 2022
let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ActiniumIOC.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
let AVHits = (iocs | where Type =~ "AVDetection"| project IoC);
SecurityAlert
| where ProviderName == 'MDATP'
| extend ThreatName_ = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| where ThreatName_ has_any (AVHits)
| extend Directory = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].Directory), SHA256 = tostring(parse_json(tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].FileHashes))[2].Value), FileName = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].Name), Hostname = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[6].FQDN)| extend AccountName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(parse_json(Entities)[6].LoggedOnUsers))[0].AccountName)
| project TimeGenerated, AlertName, ThreatName_, ProviderName, AlertSeverity, Description, RemediationSteps, ExtendedProperties, Entities, FileName,SHA256, Directory, Hostname, AccountName
| extend FileHash = SHA256, FileHashType = "SHA256"
| extend Name = tostring(split(AccountName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountName, "@")[1])
| extend Host = tostring(split(Hostname, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Hostname, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Hostname, DomainIndex + 1), Hostname)Escalation criteria
- Office Application Startup activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.
False positive considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.
# T1137 - Office Application Startup
## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Office Application Startup activity in the context of Persistence: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.
## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| File Analysis | Detect | Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| File Encryption | Harden | Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |
| File Eviction | Evict | Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. |
| Content Filtering | Isolate | Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |
## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.
## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts
## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |
## KQL
```kql
let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ActiniumIOC.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
let domains = (iocs | where Type =~ "domainname"| project IoC);
let sha256Hashes = (iocs | where Type =~ "sha256" | project IoC);
(union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes) or SHA256 in (sha256Hashes) or (ProcessCommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and ProcessCommandLine has ('/tr "wscript.exe') and ProcessCommandLine has ('"%PUBLIC%\\Pictures\\') and ProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b" /F')) or (ProcessCommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\Users\\') and ProcessCommandLine has ('.wav') and ProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b')
or (ProcessCommandLine has_all ("schtasks.exe", "create", "wscript", "e:vbscript", ".wav")))
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type, AccountName, SHA256, FileName
| extend Account = AccountName, Computer = DeviceName, FileHash = case(InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes), "InitiatingProcessSHA256", SHA256 in (sha256Hashes), "SHA256", "No Match")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = Account, ProcessCustomEntity = FileName, FileHashCustomEntity = case(FileHash == "InitiatingProcessSHA256", InitiatingProcessSHA256, FileHash == "SHA256", SHA256, "No Match"), AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
( SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where (CommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and CommandLine has ('/tr "wscript.exe') and CommandLine has ('"%PUBLIC%\\Pictures\\') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b" /F')) or (CommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\Users\\') and CommandLine has ('.wav') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b'))
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, NewProcessName, ParentProcessName, Account, NewProcessId, Type, EventID
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = Account, ProcessCustomEntity = NewProcessName
),
( CommonSecurityLog
| where FileHash in (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, FileHash, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, FileHashCustomEntity = FileHash, Account = SourceUserID, AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
( imFileEvent
| where Hash in~ (sha256Hashes) or (ActingProcessCommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('/tr "wscript.exe') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('"%PUBLIC%\\Pictures\\') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b" /F')) or (ActingProcessCommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\Users\\') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('.wav') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b')
or (ActingProcessCommandLine has_all ("schtasks.exe", "create", "wscript", "e:vbscript", ".wav")))
| extend Account = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = Hash
| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Account, HostCustomEntity = Computer, FileHashCustomEntity = FileHash, AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
(Event
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
| extend Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"], CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].["#text"], Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].["#text"])
| extend Hashes = extract_all(@"(?P<key>\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)", dynamic(["key","value"]), Hashes)
| extend Hashes = column_ifexists("Hashes", ""), CommandLine = column_ifexists("CommandLine", "")
| extend Hashes = todynamic(Hashes) | mv-expand Hashes
| where (Hashes[0] =~ "SHA256" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)) or (CommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and CommandLine has ('/tr "wscript.exe') and CommandLine has ('"%PUBLIC%\\Pictures\\') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b" /F')) or (CommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\Users\\') and CommandLine has ('.wav') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b') or (CommandLine has_all ("schtasks.exe", "create", "wscript", "e:vbscript", ".wav")))
| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, Hashes, CommandLine, Image
| extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = UserName, ProcessCustomEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), FileHashCustomEntity = tostring(Hashes[1]), AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
(DnsEvents
| where Name in~ (domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, IPAddresses, Name, ClientIP, Type
| extend DestinationIPAddress = IPAddresses, DNSName = Name, Computer
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = DestinationIPAddress
),
(VMConnection
| where RemoteDnsCanonicalNames has_any (domains)
| parse RemoteDnsCanonicalNames with * '["' DNSName '"]' *
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Direction, ProcessName, SourceIp, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, RemoteDnsQuestions, DNSName,BytesSent, BytesReceived, RemoteCountry, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = DestinationIp, File = ProcessName
),
(AzureDiagnostics
| where ResourceType == "AZUREFIREWALLS"
| where Category == "AzureFirewallApplicationRule"
| project TimeGenerated,Resource, msg_s, Type
| parse msg_s with Protocol 'request from ' SourceHost ':' SourcePort 'to ' DestinationHost ':' DestinationPort '. Action:' Action
| where isnotempty(DestinationHost)
| where DestinationHost has_any (domains)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = DestinationHost, IPCustomEntity = SourceHost
),
(AzureDiagnostics
| where ResourceType == "AZUREFIREWALLS"
| where Category == "AzureFirewallDnsProxy"
| project TimeGenerated,Resource, msg_s, Type
| parse msg_s with "DNS Request: " ClientIP ":" ClientPort " - " QueryID " " Request_Type " " Request_Class " " Request_Name ". " Request_Protocol " " Request_Size " " EDNSO_DO " " EDNS0_Buffersize " " Responce_Code " " Responce_Flags " " Responce_Size " " Response_Duration
| where Request_Name has_any (domains)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = Request_Name, IPCustomEntity = ClientIP
),
(AZFWApplicationRule
| where isnotempty(Fqdn)
| where Fqdn has_any (domains)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = Fqdn, IPCustomEntity = SourceIp
),
(AZFWDnsQuery
| where isnotempty(QueryName)
| where QueryName has_any (domains)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = QueryName, IPCustomEntity = SourceIp
),
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| where RemoteUrl in~ (domains)
| project Type, TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = DeviceName , AccountCustomEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, DNSName = RemoteUrl, IPCustomEntity = RemoteIP
)
)
```
```kql
let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ActiniumIOC.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
let AVHits = (iocs | where Type =~ "AVDetection"| project IoC);
SecurityAlert
| where ProviderName == 'MDATP'
| extend ThreatName_ = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| where ThreatName_ has_any (AVHits)
| extend Directory = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].Directory), SHA256 = tostring(parse_json(tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].FileHashes))[2].Value), FileName = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].Name), Hostname = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[6].FQDN)| extend AccountName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(parse_json(Entities)[6].LoggedOnUsers))[0].AccountName)
| project TimeGenerated, AlertName, ThreatName_, ProviderName, AlertSeverity, Description, RemediationSteps, ExtendedProperties, Entities, FileName,SHA256, Directory, Hostname, AccountName
| extend FileHash = SHA256, FileHashType = "SHA256"
| extend Name = tostring(split(AccountName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountName, "@")[1])
| extend Host = tostring(split(Hostname, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Hostname, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Hostname, DomainIndex + 1), Hostname)
```
## Escalation Criteria
- Office Application Startup activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.
## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.
Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.
Want to push this directly to Confluence? Upgrade to Basyrix Pro.
- /api/techniques/T1137.json
- /api/recommendations/T1137.json
- /api/d3fend/T1137.json
- /api/mappings/T1137.json
- /api/confluence/T1137.md
Example curl:
curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1137.jsonResponse:
{
"technique_id": "T1137",
"name": "Office Application Startup",
"priority": "high",
"status": "draft",
"version": "0.1.0",
"last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
"generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
"tactics": [
"Persistence"
],
"platforms": [
"Windows",
"Office Suite"
],
"summary": "Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins...",
"soc_recommendation": "Investigate Office Application Startup activity in the context of Persistence: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
"d3fend_mappings": [
{
"id": "D3-FA",
"name": "File Analysis",
"relationship": "detect",
"practical_action": "Monitor for File Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
"tooling": [
"Defender for Endpoint"
]
},
{
"id": "D3-FE",
"name": "File Encryption",
"relationship": "harden",
"practical_action": "Apply File Encryption to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs.",
"tooling": [
"Defender for Endpoint"
]
},
{
"id": "D3-FEV",
"name": "File Eviction",
"relationship": "evict",
"practical_action": "Use File Eviction to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed.",
"tooling": [
"Defender for Endpoint"
]
},
{
"id": "D3-CF",
"name": "Content Filtering",
"relationship": "isolate",
"practical_action": "Apply Content Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
"tooling": [
"Defender for Endpoint"
]
}
],
"investigation_steps": {
"microsoft": [
"Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
"Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
"Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
],
"generic": [
"Confirm whether the observed office application startup activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
"Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
"Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
"Real detection reference: \"[Deprecated] - Aqua Blizzard Actor IOCs - Feb 2022\" -- This query has been deprecated as the associated IoCs (Indicators of Compromise) are outdated and no longer relevant. To ensure effective threat detection, it is recommended to implement Microsoft's Threat Intelligence solution, which enables matching your log data with the most up-to-date IoCs generated by Microsoft. This solution can be installed from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub if not currently deployed. More details on the Content Hub can be found here: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy'"
]
},
"evidence_to_collect": [
"Host or resource affected",
"Account or identity involved",
"Timestamp of the activity",
"Related process, file, or network artifact",
"Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
],
"response_actions": [
{
"name": "Contain the affected host or account",
"category": "Containment",
"risk": "Medium",
"automation_safe": false,
"approval_required": true,
"tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
"notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
},
{
"name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
"category": "Investigation",
"risk": "Low",
"automation_safe": true,
"approval_required": false,
"tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
"notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
}
],
"queries": {
"kql": [
{
"name": "825991eb-ea39-4590-9de2-ee97ef42eb93 — [Deprecated] - Aqua Blizzard Actor IOCs - Feb 2022",
"description": "This query has been deprecated as the associated IoCs (Indicators of Compromise) are outdated and no longer relevant. To ensure effective threat detection, it is recommended to implement Microsoft's Threat Intelligence solution, which enables matching your log data with the most up-to-date IoCs generated by Microsoft. This solution can be installed from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub if not currently deployed. More details on the Content Hub can be found here: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
"query": "let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ActiniumIOC.csv\"] with (format=\"csv\", ignoreFirstRecord=True);\nlet domains = (iocs | where Type =~ \"domainname\"| project IoC);\nlet sha256Hashes = (iocs | where Type =~ \"sha256\" | project IoC);\n(union isfuzzy=true\n(DeviceProcessEvents\n| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes) or SHA256 in (sha256Hashes) or (ProcessCommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and ProcessCommandLine has ('/tr \"wscript.exe') and ProcessCommandLine has ('\"%PUBLIC%\\\\Pictures\\\\') and ProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b\" /F')) or (ProcessCommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\\\Users\\\\') and ProcessCommandLine has ('.wav') and ProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b') \nor (ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"schtasks.exe\", \"create\", \"wscript\", \"e:vbscript\", \".wav\")))\n| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type, AccountName, SHA256, FileName\n| extend Account = AccountName, Computer = DeviceName, FileHash = case(InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes), \"InitiatingProcessSHA256\", SHA256 in (sha256Hashes), \"SHA256\", \"No Match\")\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = Account, ProcessCustomEntity = FileName, FileHashCustomEntity = case(FileHash == \"InitiatingProcessSHA256\", InitiatingProcessSHA256, FileHash == \"SHA256\", SHA256, \"No Match\"), AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n),\n( SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4688\n| where (CommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and CommandLine has ('/tr \"wscript.exe') and CommandLine has ('\"%PUBLIC%\\\\Pictures\\\\') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b\" /F')) or (CommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\\\Users\\\\') and CommandLine has ('.wav') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b'))\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, NewProcessName, ParentProcessName, Account, NewProcessId, Type, EventID\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = Account, ProcessCustomEntity = NewProcessName\n),\n( CommonSecurityLog\n| where FileHash in (sha256Hashes)\n| project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, FileHash, Type\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, FileHashCustomEntity = FileHash, Account = SourceUserID, AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n),\n( imFileEvent\n| where Hash in~ (sha256Hashes) or (ActingProcessCommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('/tr \"wscript.exe') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('\"%PUBLIC%\\\\Pictures\\\\') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b\" /F')) or (ActingProcessCommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\\\Users\\\\') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('.wav') and ActingProcessCommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b') \n or (ActingProcessCommandLine has_all (\"schtasks.exe\", \"create\", \"wscript\", \"e:vbscript\", \".wav\")))\n| extend Account = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = Hash\n| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Account, HostCustomEntity = Computer, FileHashCustomEntity = FileHash, AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n),\n(Event\n| where Source == \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\"\n| where EventID == 1\n| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)\n| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data\n| extend Image = EventDetail.[4].[\"#text\"], CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].[\"#text\"], Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].[\"#text\"])\n| extend Hashes = extract_all(@\"(?P<key>\\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)\", dynamic([\"key\",\"value\"]), Hashes)\n| extend Hashes = column_ifexists(\"Hashes\", \"\"), CommandLine = column_ifexists(\"CommandLine\", \"\")\n| extend Hashes = todynamic(Hashes) | mv-expand Hashes\n| where (Hashes[0] =~ \"SHA256\" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)) or (CommandLine has ('schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn') and CommandLine has ('/tr \"wscript.exe') and CommandLine has ('\"%PUBLIC%\\\\Pictures\\\\') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b\" /F')) or (CommandLine has ('wscript.exe C:\\\\Users\\\\') and CommandLine has ('.wav') and CommandLine has ('//e:VBScript //b') or (CommandLine has_all (\"schtasks.exe\", \"create\", \"wscript\", \"e:vbscript\", \".wav\")))\n| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, Hashes, CommandLine, Image\n| extend Type = strcat(Type, \": \", Source)\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = UserName, ProcessCustomEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\\\', -1)[-1]), FileHashCustomEntity = tostring(Hashes[1]), AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n),\n(DnsEvents\n| where Name in~ (domains) \n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, IPAddresses, Name, ClientIP, Type\n| extend DestinationIPAddress = IPAddresses, DNSName = Name, Computer \n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = DestinationIPAddress\n),\n(VMConnection\n| where RemoteDnsCanonicalNames has_any (domains)\n| parse RemoteDnsCanonicalNames with * '[\"' DNSName '\"]' *\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Direction, ProcessName, SourceIp, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, RemoteDnsQuestions, DNSName,BytesSent, BytesReceived, RemoteCountry, Type\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = DestinationIp, File = ProcessName\n),\n(AzureDiagnostics \n| where ResourceType == \"AZUREFIREWALLS\"\n| where Category == \"AzureFirewallApplicationRule\"\n| project TimeGenerated,Resource, msg_s, Type\n| parse msg_s with Protocol 'request from ' SourceHost ':' SourcePort 'to ' DestinationHost ':' DestinationPort '. Action:' Action\n| where isnotempty(DestinationHost)\n| where DestinationHost has_any (domains) \n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = DestinationHost, IPCustomEntity = SourceHost\n),\n(AzureDiagnostics\n| where ResourceType == \"AZUREFIREWALLS\"\n| where Category == \"AzureFirewallDnsProxy\"\n| project TimeGenerated,Resource, msg_s, Type\n| parse msg_s with \"DNS Request: \" ClientIP \":\" ClientPort \" - \" QueryID \" \" Request_Type \" \" Request_Class \" \" Request_Name \". \" Request_Protocol \" \" Request_Size \" \" EDNSO_DO \" \" EDNS0_Buffersize \" \" Responce_Code \" \" Responce_Flags \" \" Responce_Size \" \" Response_Duration\n| where Request_Name has_any (domains)\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = Request_Name, IPCustomEntity = ClientIP\n),\n(AZFWApplicationRule\n| where isnotempty(Fqdn)\n| where Fqdn has_any (domains) \n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = Fqdn, IPCustomEntity = SourceIp\n),\n(AZFWDnsQuery\n| where isnotempty(QueryName)\n| where QueryName has_any (domains)\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DNSName = QueryName, IPCustomEntity = SourceIp\n),\n(DeviceNetworkEvents \n| where isnotempty(RemoteUrl) \n| where RemoteUrl in~ (domains) \n| project Type, TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessAccountName\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = DeviceName , AccountCustomEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, DNSName = RemoteUrl, IPCustomEntity = RemoteIP\n)\n)"
},
{
"name": "18dbdc22-b69f-4109-9e39-723d9465f45f — Aqua Blizzard AV hits - Feb 2022",
"description": "Identifies a match in the Security Alert table for MDATP hits related to the Aqua Blizzard actor' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
"query": "let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ActiniumIOC.csv\"] with (format=\"csv\", ignoreFirstRecord=True);\nlet AVHits = (iocs | where Type =~ \"AVDetection\"| project IoC);\nSecurityAlert\n| where ProviderName == 'MDATP'\n| extend ThreatName_ = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)\n| where ThreatName_ has_any (AVHits)\n| extend Directory = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].Directory), SHA256 = tostring(parse_json(tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].FileHashes))[2].Value), FileName = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].Name), Hostname = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[6].FQDN)| extend AccountName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(parse_json(Entities)[6].LoggedOnUsers))[0].AccountName)\n| project TimeGenerated, AlertName, ThreatName_, ProviderName, AlertSeverity, Description, RemediationSteps, ExtendedProperties, Entities, FileName,SHA256, Directory, Hostname, AccountName\n| extend FileHash = SHA256, FileHashType = \"SHA256\"\n| extend Name = tostring(split(AccountName, \"@\")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountName, \"@\")[1])\n| extend Host = tostring(split(Hostname, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Hostname, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Hostname, DomainIndex + 1), Hostname)"
}
],
"spl": [],
"esql": [
{
"name": "1c3d9346-4591-4894-935c-dad2824850f2 — M365 Exchange Inbox Rule with Obfuscated Name",
"description": "(ESQL) Identifies when a Microsoft Exchange inbox rule is created or modified with a name composed only of special characters. Adversaries may use obfuscated inbox rule names to evade detection, hide malicious forwarding or deletion rules, or blend in with benign audit noise. The rule name is parsed from \"o365.audit.ObjectId\", which encodes the mailbox identity and rule name separated by a backslash. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
"query": "from logs-o365.audit-* metadata _id, _version, _index\n| where\n data_stream.dataset == \"o365.audit\" and\n event.provider == \"Exchange\" and\n event.action in (\"New-InboxRule\", \"Set-InboxRule\") and\n event.outcome == \"success\" and\n o365.audit.ObjectId is not null\n| grok o365.audit.ObjectId \"\"\".*\\\\\\\\(?<Esql.inbox_rule_name>.*)$\"\"\"\n// only special chars in inbox rule name\n| where Esql.inbox_rule_name rlike \"\"\"[!@#$%^&*()_+={[\\]|\\\\:;\"'<,>.?/~` \\-]+\"\"\"\n| keep\n @timestamp,\n _id,\n _version,\n _index,\n Esql.inbox_rule_name,\n o365.audit.ObjectId,\n o365.audit.UserId,\n o365.audit.ApplicationId,\n user.name,\n user.domain,\n event.action,\n source.ip,\n source.as.number,\n source.as.organization.name,\n o365.audit.Parameters.ForwardTo,\n o365.audit.Parameters.ForwardAsAttachmentTo,\n o365.audit.Parameters.RedirectTo"
},
{
"name": "ac5a2759-5c34-440a-b0c4-51fe674611d6 — Outlook Home Page Registry Modification",
"description": "(EQL) Identifies modifications in registry keys associated with abuse of the Outlook Home Page functionality for command and control or persistence. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
"query": "registry where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.action != \"deletion\" and registry.value : \"URL\" and\n registry.path : (\n \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Office\\\\*\\\\Outlook\\\\Webview\\\\*\",\n \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Office\\\\*\\\\Outlook\\\\Today\\\\*\"\n ) and registry.data.strings : (\"*://*\", \"*:\\\\*\", \"\\\\\\\\*\\\\*\")"
}
]
},
"automation": {
"safe": [
"Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
"Run enrichment queries.",
"Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
],
"approval_required": [
"Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
"Any change to production configuration."
]
},
"escalation_criteria": [
"Office Application Startup activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
"Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
"Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
],
"false_positive_considerations": [
"Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
"Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
"Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
],
"confluence": {
"title": "T1137 - Office Application Startup Response Guidance",
"labels": [
"mitre",
"attack",
"d3fend",
"secops",
"basyrix"
],
"sections": [
"summary",
"d3fend_mappings",
"investigation_steps",
"response_actions",
"queries",
"automation",
"escalation_criteria",
"false_positive_considerations"
]
}
}