T1203 — Exploitation for Client Execution

# T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Exploitation for Client Execution activity in the context of Execution: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Memory Boundary Tracking | Detect | Monitor for Memory Boundary Tracking indicators relevant to this technique. |
| Process Segment Execution Prevention | Harden | Apply Process Segment Execution Prevention to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let Threshold = 1;  
 AzureDiagnostics
 | where Category == "ApplicationGatewayFirewallLog"
 | where action_s == "Matched"
 | project transactionId_g, hostname_s, requestUri_s, TimeGenerated, clientIp_s, Message, details_message_s, details_data_s
 | join kind = inner(
 AzureDiagnostics
 | where Category == "ApplicationGatewayFirewallLog"
 | where action_s == "Blocked"
 | parse Message with MessageText 'Total Inbound Score: ' TotalInboundScore ' - SQLI=' SQLI_Score ',XSS=' XSS_Score ',RFI=' RFI_Score ',LFI=' LFI_Score ',RCE=' RCE_Score ',PHPI=' PHPI_Score ',HTTP=' HTTP_Score ',SESS=' SESS_Score '): ' Blocked_Reason '; individual paranoia level scores:' Paranoia_Score
 | where Blocked_Reason contains "XSS" and toint(TotalInboundScore) >=15 and toint(XSS_Score) >= 10 and toint(SQLI_Score) <= 5) on transactionId_g
 | extend Uri = strcat(hostname_s,requestUri_s)
 | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated), TransactionID = make_set(transactionId_g), Message = make_set(Message), Detail_Message = make_set(details_message_s), Detail_Data = make_set(details_data_s), Total_TransactionId = dcount(transactionId_g) by clientIp_s, Uri, action_s, SQLI_Score, XSS_Score, TotalInboundScore
 | where Total_TransactionId >= Threshold
```
```kql
let sha256Hashes = dynamic(["5dd1ca0d471dee41eb3ea0b6ea117810f228354fc3b7b47400a812573d40d91d", "5fc44c7342b84f50f24758e39c8848b2f0991e8817ef5465844f5f2ff6085a57", "6cff0bbd62efe99f381e5cc0c4182b0fb7a9a34e4be9ce68ee6b0d0ea3eee39c"]);
let signames = dynamic(["Ransom:Win32/Prestige"]);
(union isfuzzy=true
(CommonSecurityLog
| where FileHash in (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, FileHash, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, Algorithm = "SHA256", AccountNTName = SourceUserID
),
(imFileEvent
| where TargetFileSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| extend AccountNT = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = TargetFileSHA256
| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, AccountNT, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash, Algorithm = "SHA256"
),
(Event
| where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
| extend ProcessId = tolong(EventDetail.[3].["#text"]), Image = tostring(EventDetail.[4].["#text"]), CommandLine = tostring(EventDetail.[10].["#text"]), Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].["#text"])
| extend Hashes = extract_all(@"(?P<key>\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)", dynamic(["key","value"]), Hashes)
| extend Hashes = column_ifexists("Hashes", dynamic(["", ""])), CommandLine = column_ifexists("CommandLine", "")
| mv-expand Hashes
| where Hashes[0] =~ "SHA256" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)  
| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, ProcessId, Hashes, CommandLine, Image
| extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
| extend AccountNT = UserName, InitiatingProcessId = ProcessId
| extend Process = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(Hashes[1]) 
),
(DeviceEvents
| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes) or SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
| extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName
| extend Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
| extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName
| extend Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
),
(DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
| extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName
| extend Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
),
(SecurityAlert
| where ProductName == "Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection"
| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| where isnotempty(ThreatName)
| where ThreatName has_any (signames)
| extend Computer = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].HostName)
)
)
| extend AccountNTName = tostring(split(AccountNT, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(AccountNT, "\\")[1])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex
```
```kql
SecurityNestedRecommendation
| where RemediationDescription has 'CVE-2021-38647'
| parse ResourceDetails with * 'virtualMachines/' VirtualMAchine '"' *
| summarize arg_min(TimeGenerated, *) by TenantId, RecommendationSubscriptionId, VirtualMAchine, RecommendationName,Description,RemediationDescription, tostring(AdditionalData),VulnerabilityId
| extend HostName = tostring(split(VirtualMAchine, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(VirtualMAchine, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(VirtualMAchine, DomainIndex + 1), VirtualMAchine)
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Exploitation for Client Execution activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1203.json
• /api/recommendations/T1203.json
• /api/d3fend/T1203.json
• /api/mappings/T1203.json
• /api/confluence/T1203.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1203.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1203",
  "name": "Exploitation for Client Execution",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Execution"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Exploitation for Client Execution activity in the context of Execution: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-MBT",
      "name": "Memory Boundary Tracking",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for Memory Boundary Tracking indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-PSEP",
      "name": "Process Segment Execution Prevention",
      "relationship": "harden",
      "practical_action": "Apply Process Segment Execution Prevention to reduce this technique's viability before an incident occurs.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed exploitation for client execution activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"Application Gateway WAF - XSS Detection\" -- Identifies a match for XSS attack in the Application gateway WAF logs. The Threshold value in the query can be changed as per your infrastructure's requirement. References: https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A7_2017-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS)'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "d2bc08fa-030a-4eea-931a-762d27c6a042 — Application Gateway WAF - XSS Detection",
        "description": "Identifies a match for XSS attack in the Application gateway WAF logs. The Threshold value in the query can be changed as per your infrastructure's requirement. References: https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A7_2017-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS)' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let Threshold = 1;  \n AzureDiagnostics\n | where Category == \"ApplicationGatewayFirewallLog\"\n | where action_s == \"Matched\"\n | project transactionId_g, hostname_s, requestUri_s, TimeGenerated, clientIp_s, Message, details_message_s, details_data_s\n | join kind = inner(\n AzureDiagnostics\n | where Category == \"ApplicationGatewayFirewallLog\"\n | where action_s == \"Blocked\"\n | parse Message with MessageText 'Total Inbound Score: ' TotalInboundScore ' - SQLI=' SQLI_Score ',XSS=' XSS_Score ',RFI=' RFI_Score ',LFI=' LFI_Score ',RCE=' RCE_Score ',PHPI=' PHPI_Score ',HTTP=' HTTP_Score ',SESS=' SESS_Score '): ' Blocked_Reason '; individual paranoia level scores:' Paranoia_Score\n | where Blocked_Reason contains \"XSS\" and toint(TotalInboundScore) >=15 and toint(XSS_Score) >= 10 and toint(SQLI_Score) <= 5) on transactionId_g\n | extend Uri = strcat(hostname_s,requestUri_s)\n | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated), TransactionID = make_set(transactionId_g), Message = make_set(Message), Detail_Message = make_set(details_message_s), Detail_Data = make_set(details_data_s), Total_TransactionId = dcount(transactionId_g) by clientIp_s, Uri, action_s, SQLI_Score, XSS_Score, TotalInboundScore\n | where Total_TransactionId >= Threshold"
      },
      {
        "name": "bca9c877-2afc-4246-a26d-087ab1cdcd5f — Prestige ransomware IOCs Oct 2022",
        "description": "This query looks for file hashes and AV signatures associated with Prestige ransomware payload.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let sha256Hashes = dynamic([\"5dd1ca0d471dee41eb3ea0b6ea117810f228354fc3b7b47400a812573d40d91d\", \"5fc44c7342b84f50f24758e39c8848b2f0991e8817ef5465844f5f2ff6085a57\", \"6cff0bbd62efe99f381e5cc0c4182b0fb7a9a34e4be9ce68ee6b0d0ea3eee39c\"]);\nlet signames = dynamic([\"Ransom:Win32/Prestige\"]);\n(union isfuzzy=true\n(CommonSecurityLog\n| where FileHash in (sha256Hashes)\n| project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, FileHash, Type\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, Algorithm = \"SHA256\", AccountNTName = SourceUserID\n),\n(imFileEvent\n| where TargetFileSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)\n| extend AccountNT = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = TargetFileSHA256\n| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, AccountNT, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash, Algorithm = \"SHA256\"\n),\n(Event\n| where Source =~ \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\"\n| where EventID == 1\n| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)\n| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data\n| extend ProcessId = tolong(EventDetail.[3].[\"#text\"]), Image = tostring(EventDetail.[4].[\"#text\"]), CommandLine = tostring(EventDetail.[10].[\"#text\"]), Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].[\"#text\"])\n| extend Hashes = extract_all(@\"(?P<key>\\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)\", dynamic([\"key\",\"value\"]), Hashes)\n| extend Hashes = column_ifexists(\"Hashes\", dynamic([\"\", \"\"])), CommandLine = column_ifexists(\"CommandLine\", \"\")\n| mv-expand Hashes\n| where Hashes[0] =~ \"SHA256\" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)  \n| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, ProcessId, Hashes, CommandLine, Image\n| extend Type = strcat(Type, \": \", Source)\n| extend AccountNT = UserName, InitiatingProcessId = ProcessId\n| extend Process = tostring(split(Image, '\\\\', -1)[-1]), Algorithm = \"SHA256\", FileHash = tostring(Hashes[1]) \n),\n(DeviceEvents\n| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes) or SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)\n| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type\n| extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName\n| extend Algorithm = \"SHA256\", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath\n),\n(DeviceFileEvents\n| where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)\n| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type\n| extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName\n| extend Algorithm = \"SHA256\", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath\n),\n(DeviceImageLoadEvents\n| where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)\n| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type\n| extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName\n| extend Algorithm = \"SHA256\", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath\n),\n(SecurityAlert\n| where ProductName == \"Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection\"\n| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)\n| where isnotempty(ThreatName)\n| where ThreatName has_any (signames)\n| extend Computer = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].HostName)\n)\n)\n| extend AccountNTName = tostring(split(AccountNT, \"\\\\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(AccountNT, \"\\\\\")[1])\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| project-away DomainIndex"
      },
      {
        "name": "4d94d4a9-dc96-450a-9dea-4d4d4594199b — Vulnerable Machines related to OMIGOD CVE-2021-38647",
        "description": "This query uses the Azure Defender Security Nested Recommendations data to find machines vulnerable to OMIGOD CVE-2021-38647. OMI is the Linux equivalent of Windows WMI and helps users manage configurations across remote and local environments. The query aims to find machines that have this OMI vulnerability (CVE-2021-38647). Security Nested Recommendations data is sent to Microsoft Sentinel using the continuous export feature of Azure Defender(refrence link below). Reference: https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/continuous-export?tabs=azure-portal' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "SecurityNestedRecommendation\n| where RemediationDescription has 'CVE-2021-38647'\n| parse ResourceDetails with * 'virtualMachines/' VirtualMAchine '\"' *\n| summarize arg_min(TimeGenerated, *) by TenantId, RecommendationSubscriptionId, VirtualMAchine, RecommendationName,Description,RemediationDescription, tostring(AdditionalData),VulnerabilityId\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(VirtualMAchine, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(VirtualMAchine, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(VirtualMAchine, DomainIndex + 1), VirtualMAchine)"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "44b8d933-8fed-485d-a0af-bd97d0093439 — Multiple DHCP Servers Responding to the Same Transaction",
        "description": "(ESQL) Identifies two or more distinct DHCP servers sending an OFFER or ACK for the same transaction ID (xid) within a short window, indicating a rogue DHCP server racing the legitimate one to win the client's handshake. This is the rogue-DHCP / adversary-in-the-middle precondition (T1557.003) and is operating-system agnostic, since it keys only on server behavior observed on the wire... (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "from logs-network_traffic.dhcpv4-*, packetbeat-*\n| eval\n    message_type = TO_LOWER(COALESCE(network_traffic.dhcpv4.option.message_type, dhcpv4.option.message_type)),\n    Esql.transaction_id = COALESCE(network_traffic.dhcpv4.transaction_id, dhcpv4.transaction_id),\n    server_identifier = COALESCE(network_traffic.dhcpv4.option.server_identifier, dhcpv4.option.server_identifier)\n| where message_type in (\"offer\", \"ack\") and Esql.transaction_id is not null and source.ip is not null\n| eval Esql.time_window = DATE_TRUNC(30 seconds, @timestamp)\n| stats\n    Esql.count_distinct_servers = COUNT_DISTINCT(source.ip),\n    Esql.values_server_ips = VALUES(source.ip),\n    Esql.values_server_identifiers = VALUES(server_identifier),\n    Esql.count_replies = COUNT(*)\n  by Esql.time_window, Esql.transaction_id\n| where Esql.count_distinct_servers >= 2\n| keep Esql.transaction_id, Esql.time_window, Esql.count_distinct_servers, Esql.values_server_ips, Esql.values_server_identifiers, Esql.count_replies"
      },
      {
        "name": "640f0535-f784-4010-b999-39db99d2daeb — Potential Git CVE-2025-48384 Exploitation",
        "description": "(EQL) This rule detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-48384 via Git. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by leveraging Git's recursive clone feature to fetch and execute malicious scripts from a remote repository. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m\n  [process where host.os.type in (\"linux\", \"macos\") and event.type == \"start\" and event.action in (\"exec\", \"executed\", \"process_started\", \"start\", \"ProcessRollup2\") and\n   process.name == \"git\" and process.args == \"clone\" and process.args == \"--recursive\" and process.args like~ \"http*\"] by process.entity_id\n  [process where host.os.type in (\"linux\", \"macos\") and event.type == \"start\" and event.action in (\"exec\", \"executed\", \"process_started\", \"start\", \"ProcessRollup2\") and\n   process.name in (\n    \"dash\", \"sh\", \"static-sh\", \"bash\", \"bash-static\", \"zsh\", \"ash\", \"csh\", \"ksh\", \"tcsh\", \"busybox\", \"fish\", \"ksh93\", \"rksh\",\n    \"rksh93\", \"lksh\", \"mksh\", \"mksh-static\", \"csharp\", \"posh\", \"rc\", \"sash\", \"yash\", \"zsh5\", \"zsh5-static\"\n   )] by process.parent.entity_id"
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Exploitation for Client Execution activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}