T1482 — Domain Trust Discovery

# T1482 - Domain Trust Discovery

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Domain Trust Discovery activity in the context of Discovery: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let ReconTools = dynamic([
    "adfind.exe",
    "dsquery.exe",
    "sharphound.exe",
    "bloodhound.exe"
]);
let ReconCommandPatterns = dynamic([
    "Get-DomainUser",
    "Get-DomainGroup",
    "Get-DomainTrust",
    "Get-NetUser",
    "Get-NetGroup",
    "Invoke-BloodHound"
]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)
| where FileName in~ (ReconTools) or ProcessCommandLine has_any (ReconCommandPatterns)
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    DeviceName,
    DeviceId,
    AccountName,
    FileName,
    ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,
         HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,
         AccountCustomEntity = AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```
```kql
let args = dynamic(["objectcategory","domainlist","dcmodes","adinfo","trustdmp","computers_pwdnotreqd","Domain Admins", "objectcategory=person", "objectcategory=computer", "objectcategory=*","dclist"]);
let parentProcesses = dynamic(["pwsh.exe","powershell.exe","cmd.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
//looks for execution from a shell
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (parentProcesses)
// main filter
| where FileName =~ "AdFind.exe" or SHA256 == "c92c158d7c37fea795114fa6491fe5f145ad2f8c08776b18ae79db811e8e36a3"
   // AdFind common Flags to check for from various threat actor TTPs
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any (args)
| extend HostName = split(DeviceName, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(DeviceName, '.'), 1, -1), '.'), FileHashAlgorithm = "SHA256"
```
```kql
(union isfuzzy=true
(SecurityEvent
| where EventID==4688
| where CommandLine has "wmic computersystem get domain" and ParentProcessName has "dllhost.exe"
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type
),
(DeviceProcessEvents 
| where ProcessCommandLine has "wmic computersystem get domain" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "dllhost.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "dllhost.exe"
| extend Account = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, @'\', InitiatingProcessAccountName), Computer = DeviceName
)
)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Domain Trust Discovery activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1482.json
• /api/recommendations/T1482.json
• /api/d3fend/T1482.json
• /api/mappings/T1482.json
• /api/confluence/T1482.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1482.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1482",
  "name": "Domain Trust Discovery",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Domain Trust Discovery activity in the context of Discovery: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-NTA",
      "name": "Network Traffic Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Sentinel",
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed domain trust discovery activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"AD Reconnaissance Tooling Execution\" -- Flags execution of common Active Directory enumeration tools (AdFind, dsquery, BloodHound/SharpHound, PowerView) used for domain account and trust discovery."
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "GEN-DI-001 — AD Reconnaissance Tooling Execution",
        "description": "Flags execution of common Active Directory enumeration tools (AdFind, dsquery, BloodHound/SharpHound, PowerView) used for domain account and trust discovery. (Source: Bell Integration baseline detection library.)",
        "query": "let ReconTools = dynamic([\n    \"adfind.exe\",\n    \"dsquery.exe\",\n    \"sharphound.exe\",\n    \"bloodhound.exe\"\n]);\nlet ReconCommandPatterns = dynamic([\n    \"Get-DomainUser\",\n    \"Get-DomainGroup\",\n    \"Get-DomainTrust\",\n    \"Get-NetUser\",\n    \"Get-NetGroup\",\n    \"Invoke-BloodHound\"\n]);\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)\n| where FileName in~ (ReconTools) or ProcessCommandLine has_any (ReconCommandPatterns)\n| project\n    TimeGenerated,\n    DeviceName,\n    DeviceId,\n    AccountName,\n    FileName,\n    ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName,\n    InitiatingProcessCommandLine\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,\n         HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,\n         AccountCustomEntity = AccountName\n| order by TimeGenerated desc"
      },
      {
        "name": "c63ae777-d5e0-4113-8c9a-c2c9d3d09fcd — Probable AdFind Recon Tool Usage",
        "description": "This query identifies the host and account that executed AdFind, by hash and filename, in addition to the flags commonly utilized by various threat actors during the reconnaissance phase.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let args = dynamic([\"objectcategory\",\"domainlist\",\"dcmodes\",\"adinfo\",\"trustdmp\",\"computers_pwdnotreqd\",\"Domain Admins\", \"objectcategory=person\", \"objectcategory=computer\", \"objectcategory=*\",\"dclist\"]);\nlet parentProcesses = dynamic([\"pwsh.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"cmd.exe\"]);\nDeviceProcessEvents\n//looks for execution from a shell\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (parentProcesses)\n// main filter\n| where FileName =~ \"AdFind.exe\" or SHA256 == \"c92c158d7c37fea795114fa6491fe5f145ad2f8c08776b18ae79db811e8e36a3\"\n   // AdFind common Flags to check for from various threat actor TTPs\n    or ProcessCommandLine has_any (args)\n| extend HostName = split(DeviceName, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(DeviceName, '.'), 1, -1), '.'), FileHashAlgorithm = \"SHA256\""
      },
      {
        "name": "6b652b4f-9810-4eec-9027-7aa88ce4db23 — Dev-0270 WMIC  Discovery",
        "description": "The query below identifies dllhost.exe using WMIC to discover additional hosts and associated domains in the environment.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "(union isfuzzy=true\n(SecurityEvent\n| where EventID==4688\n| where CommandLine has \"wmic computersystem get domain\" and ParentProcessName has \"dllhost.exe\"\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type\n),\n(DeviceProcessEvents \n| where ProcessCommandLine has \"wmic computersystem get domain\" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"dllhost.exe\" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has \"dllhost.exe\"\n| extend Account = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, @'\\', InitiatingProcessAccountName), Computer = DeviceName\n)\n)\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\\')[0])"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "730ed57d-ae0f-444f-af50-78708b57edd5 — Suspicious JetBrains TeamCity Child Process",
        "description": "(EQL) Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the JetBrain TeamCity process. This activity could be related to JetBrains remote code execution vulnerabilities. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "process where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.type == \"start\" and\n  process.parent.executable :\n                 (\"?:\\\\TeamCity\\\\jre\\\\bin\\\\java.exe\",\n                  \"?:\\\\Program Files\\\\TeamCity\\\\jre\\\\bin\\\\java.exe\",\n                  \"?:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\TeamCity\\\\jre\\\\bin\\\\java.exe\",\n                  \"?:\\\\TeamCity\\\\BuildAgent\\\\jre\\\\bin\\\\java.exe\") and\n  process.name : (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"msiexec.exe\", \"certutil.exe\", \"bitsadmin.exe\", \"wmic.exe\", \"curl.exe\", \"ssh.exe\",\n                   \"rundll32.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"certreq.exe\", \"net.exe\", \"nltest.exe\", \"whoami.exe\", \"hostname.exe\",\n                   \"tasklist.exe\", \"arp.exe\", \"nbtstat.exe\", \"netstat.exe\", \"reg.exe\", \"tasklist.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\",\n                   \"arp.exe\", \"atbroker.exe\", \"bginfo.exe\", \"bitsadmin.exe\", \"cdb.exe\", \"cmstp.exe\", \"control.exe\", \"cscript.exe\", \"csi.exe\",\n                   \"dnx.exe\", \"dsget.exe\", \"dsquery.exe\", \"forfiles.exe\", \"fsi.exe\", \"ftp.exe\", \"gpresult.exe\", \"ieexec.exe\", \"iexpress.exe\",\n                   \"installutil.exe\", \"ipconfig.exe\",\"msxsl.exe\", \"netsh.exe\", \"odbcconf.exe\", \"ping.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"qprocess.exe\",\n                   \"quser.exe\", \"qwinsta.exe\", \"rcsi.exe\", \"regasm.exe\", \"regsvcs.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\", \"sc.exe\", \"schtasks.exe\",\n                   \"systeminfo.exe\", \"tracert.exe\", \"wmic.exe\", \"wscript.exe\",\"xwizard.exe\", \"explorer.exe\", \"msdt.exe\") and\n not (process.name : \"powershell.exe\" and process.args : \"-ExecutionPolicy\" and process.args : \"?:\\\\TeamCity\\\\buildAgent\\\\work\\\\*.ps1\") and\n not (process.name : \"cmd.exe\" and process.args : \"dir\" and process.args : \"/-c\")"
      },
      {
        "name": "ff46eb26-0684-4da3-9dd6-21032c9878e1 — Active Directory Discovery using AdExplorer",
        "description": "(EQL) This rule detects the use of ADExplorer utility. Active Directory Explorer (AD Explorer) is an advanced Active Directory (AD) viewer and editor. AD Explorer also includes the ability to save snapshots of an AD database for off-line viewing and comparisons. Adversaries may abuse this utility to perform domain reconnaissance. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "process where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.type == \"start\" and\n  (process.name : \"ADExplorer*.exe\" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == \"AdExp\")"
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Domain Trust Discovery activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1482 - Domain Trust Discovery Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}