T1561 — Disk Wipe

# T1561 - Disk Wipe

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Disk Wipe activity in the context of Impact: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Disk Partitioning | Evict | Use Disk Partitioning to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Isolate device IMMEDIATELY | Medium | No | Yes |
| Preserve forensic image before any further disk activity | Low | No | Yes |
| Notify SOC Manager and customer CISO | Low | Yes | No |
| Assess whether data can be recovered from backups | Low | No | Yes |
| If nation-state indicators: NCSC notification | Low | No | Yes |

## KQL
```kql
let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string,TLP:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/DEV-0586.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
let sha256Hashes = (iocs | where Type =~ "sha256" | project IoC);
let Command_Line = (iocs | where Type =~ "CommandLine" | project IoC);
(union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes) or SHA256 in (sha256Hashes) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has ('127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$') and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (Command_Line))
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName,  InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type, AccountName, SHA256
| extend Account = AccountName, Computer = DeviceName,  CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = case(InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes), "InitiatingProcessSHA256", SHA256 in (sha256Hashes), "SHA256", "No Match")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = Account, ProcessCustomEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, FileHashCustomEntity = case(FileHash == "InitiatingProcessSHA256", InitiatingProcessSHA256, FileHash == "SHA256", SHA256, "No Match"), AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
( SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where ( CommandLine has (@'127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$') and CommandLine has_any (Command_Line))
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, NewProcessName, ParentProcessName, Account, NewProcessId, Type, EventID
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = Account, ProcessCustomEntity = NewProcessName
),
( CommonSecurityLog
| where FileHash in (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, FileHash, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, FileHashCustomEntity = FileHash, Account = SourceUserID, AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
( imFileEvent
| where Hash in~ (sha256Hashes) or  ( ActingProcessCommandLine has ('127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$') and ActingProcessCommandLine has_any (Command_Line))
| extend Account = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = TargetFileSHA256
| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Account, HostCustomEntity = Computer, FileHashCustomEntity = FileHash, AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
),
(Event
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
| extend Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"],  CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].["#text"], Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].["#text"])
| extend Hashes = extract_all(@"(?P<key>\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)", dynamic(["key","value"]), Hashes)
| extend Hashes = column_ifexists("Hashes", ""), CommandLine = column_ifexists("CommandLine", "")
| extend Hashes = todynamic(Hashes) | mv-expand Hashes
| where (Hashes[0] =~ "SHA256" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)) or ( CommandLine has ('127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$') and CommandLine has_any (Command_Line)) 
| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, Hashes, CommandLine, Image
| extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = UserName, ProcessCustomEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), FileHashCustomEntity = tostring(Hashes[1]), AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
)
)
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Disk Wipe activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1561.json
• /api/recommendations/T1561.json
• /api/d3fend/T1561.json
• /api/mappings/T1561.json
• /api/confluence/T1561.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1561.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1561",
  "name": "Disk Wipe",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "complete",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Impact"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Windows",
    "Network Devices"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Disk Wipe activity in the context of Impact: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-DKP",
      "name": "Disk Partitioning",
      "relationship": "evict",
      "practical_action": "Use Disk Partitioning to remove the adversary's foothold once this technique is confirmed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed disk wipe activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"[Deprecated] - Cadet Blizzard Actor IOC - January 2022\" -- This query has been deprecated as the associated IoCs (Indicators of Compromise) are outdated and no longer relevant. To ensure effective threat detection, it is recommended to implement Microsoft's Threat Intelligence solution, which enables matching your log data with the most up-to-date IoCs generated by Microsoft. This solution can be installed from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub if not currently deployed. More details on the Content Hub can be found here: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Isolate device IMMEDIATELY",
      "category": "Response",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "See investigation guide"
    },
    {
      "name": "Preserve forensic image before any further disk activity",
      "category": "Response",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "See investigation guide"
    },
    {
      "name": "Notify SOC Manager and customer CISO",
      "category": "Response",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "See investigation guide"
    },
    {
      "name": "Assess whether data can be recovered from backups",
      "category": "Response",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "See investigation guide"
    },
    {
      "name": "If nation-state indicators: NCSC notification",
      "category": "Response",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "See investigation guide"
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "961b6a81-5c53-40b6-9800-4f661a8faea7 — [Deprecated] - Cadet Blizzard Actor IOC - January 2022",
        "description": "This query has been deprecated as the associated IoCs (Indicators of Compromise) are outdated and no longer relevant. To ensure effective threat detection, it is recommended to implement Microsoft's Threat Intelligence solution, which enables matching your log data with the most up-to-date IoCs generated by Microsoft. This solution can be installed from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub if not currently deployed. More details on the Content Hub can be found here: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string,TLP:string) [@\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/DEV-0586.csv\"] with (format=\"csv\", ignoreFirstRecord=True);\nlet sha256Hashes = (iocs | where Type =~ \"sha256\" | project IoC);\nlet Command_Line = (iocs | where Type =~ \"CommandLine\" | project IoC);\n(union isfuzzy=true\n(DeviceProcessEvents\n| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes) or SHA256 in (sha256Hashes) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has ('127.0.0.1\\\\ADMIN$') and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (Command_Line))\n| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName,  InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type, AccountName, SHA256\n| extend Account = AccountName, Computer = DeviceName,  CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = case(InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes), \"InitiatingProcessSHA256\", SHA256 in (sha256Hashes), \"SHA256\", \"No Match\")\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = Account, ProcessCustomEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, FileHashCustomEntity = case(FileHash == \"InitiatingProcessSHA256\", InitiatingProcessSHA256, FileHash == \"SHA256\", SHA256, \"No Match\"), AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n),\n( SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4688\n| where ( CommandLine has (@'127.0.0.1\\\\ADMIN$') and CommandLine has_any (Command_Line))\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, NewProcessName, ParentProcessName, Account, NewProcessId, Type, EventID\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = Account, ProcessCustomEntity = NewProcessName\n),\n( CommonSecurityLog\n| where FileHash in (sha256Hashes)\n| project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, FileHash, Type\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, FileHashCustomEntity = FileHash, Account = SourceUserID, AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n),\n( imFileEvent\n| where Hash in~ (sha256Hashes) or  ( ActingProcessCommandLine has ('127.0.0.1\\\\ADMIN$') and ActingProcessCommandLine has_any (Command_Line))\n| extend Account = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = TargetFileSHA256\n| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Account, HostCustomEntity = Computer, FileHashCustomEntity = FileHash, AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n),\n(Event\n| where Source == \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\"\n| where EventID == 1\n| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)\n| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data\n| extend Image = EventDetail.[4].[\"#text\"],  CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].[\"#text\"], Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].[\"#text\"])\n| extend Hashes = extract_all(@\"(?P<key>\\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)\", dynamic([\"key\",\"value\"]), Hashes)\n| extend Hashes = column_ifexists(\"Hashes\", \"\"), CommandLine = column_ifexists(\"CommandLine\", \"\")\n| extend Hashes = todynamic(Hashes) | mv-expand Hashes\n| where (Hashes[0] =~ \"SHA256\" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)) or ( CommandLine has ('127.0.0.1\\\\ADMIN$') and CommandLine has_any (Command_Line)) \n| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, Hashes, CommandLine, Image\n| extend Type = strcat(Type, \": \", Source)\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer , AccountCustomEntity = UserName, ProcessCustomEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\\\', -1)[-1]), FileHashCustomEntity = tostring(Hashes[1]), AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n)\n)"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": []
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Disk Wipe activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1561 - Disk Wipe Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}