T1567 — Exfiltration Over Web Service

# T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Exfiltration Over Web Service activity in the context of Exfiltration: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Relay Pattern Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Relay Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
| Outbound Traffic Filtering | Isolate | Apply Outbound Traffic Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let eventsThreshold = 20;
CommonSecurityLog
| where isnotempty(RequestURL)
| project TimeGenerated, RequestURL, RequestMethod, SourceIP, SourceHostName
| evaluate sequence_detect(TimeGenerated, 5s, 8s, login=(RequestURL has "login.microsoftonline.com/consumers/oauth2/v2.0/token"), graph=(RequestURL has "graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/"), SourceIP, SourceHostName)
| summarize Events=count() by SourceIP, SourceHostName
| where Events >= eventsThreshold
```
```kql
let oneDriveCalls = dynamic(['graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/data.txt:/content','graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/response.json:/content']);
let oneDriveCallsRegex = dynamic([@'graph\.microsoft\.com\/v1\.0\/me\/drive\/root\:\/Uploaded\/.*\:\/content',@'graph\.microsoft\.com\/v1\.0\/me\/drive\/root\:\/Downloaded\/.*\:\/content']);
CommonSecurityLog
| where RequestURL has_any (oneDriveCalls) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[0]) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[1])
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct, DeviceAction, DestinationDnsDomain, DestinationIP, RequestURL, SourceIP, SourceHostName, RequestClientApplication
```
```kql
AWSSecurityHubFindings
| where RecordState == "ACTIVE" and ComplianceStatus == "FAILED"
| where tostring(AwsSecurityFindingGeneratorId) == "security-control/SQS.3"
      or tostring(ComplianceSecurityControlId) == "SQS.3"
| mv-expand Resource = Resources
| where tostring(Resource.Type) == "AwsSqsQueue"
| extend QueueArn = tostring(Resource.Id)
| summarize TimeGenerated = max(TimeGenerated)
    by AwsAccountId, AwsRegion, AwsSecurityFindingTitle, AwsSecurityFindingDescription,
       AwsSecurityFindingId, ComplianceSecurityControlId, QueueArn
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Exfiltration Over Web Service activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

Want to push this directly to Confluence? Upgrade to Basyrix Pro.

• /api/techniques/T1567.json
• /api/recommendations/T1567.json
• /api/d3fend/T1567.json
• /api/mappings/T1567.json
• /api/confluence/T1567.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1567.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1567",
  "name": "Exfiltration Over Web Service",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "ESXi",
    "Linux",
    "macOS",
    "Office Suite",
    "SaaS",
    "Windows"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Exfiltration Over Web Service activity in the context of Exfiltration: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-RPA",
      "name": "Relay Pattern Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for Relay Pattern Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "D3-OTF",
      "name": "Outbound Traffic Filtering",
      "relationship": "isolate",
      "practical_action": "Apply Outbound Traffic Filtering to contain the blast radius once this technique is observed.",
      "tooling": [
        "Sentinel",
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed exfiltration over web service activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"CreepyDrive request URL sequence\" -- CreepyDrive uses OneDrive for command and control, however, it makes regular requests to predicatable paths. This detecton will alert when over 20 sequences are observed in a single day.'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "eda260eb-f4a1-4379-ad98-452604da9b3e — CreepyDrive request URL sequence",
        "description": "CreepyDrive uses OneDrive for command and control, however, it makes regular requests to predicatable paths. This detecton will alert when over 20 sequences are observed in a single day.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed), mapped via sub-technique T1567.002.)",
        "query": "let eventsThreshold = 20;\nCommonSecurityLog\n| where isnotempty(RequestURL)\n| project TimeGenerated, RequestURL, RequestMethod, SourceIP, SourceHostName\n| evaluate sequence_detect(TimeGenerated, 5s, 8s, login=(RequestURL has \"login.microsoftonline.com/consumers/oauth2/v2.0/token\"), graph=(RequestURL has \"graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/\"), SourceIP, SourceHostName)\n| summarize Events=count() by SourceIP, SourceHostName\n| where Events >= eventsThreshold"
      },
      {
        "name": "b6d03b88-4d27-49a2-9c1c-29f1ad2842dc — CreepyDrive URLs",
        "description": "CreepyDrive uses OneDrive for command and control. This detection identifies URLs specific to CreepyDrive.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed), mapped via sub-technique T1567.002.)",
        "query": "let oneDriveCalls = dynamic(['graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/data.txt:/content','graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/response.json:/content']);\nlet oneDriveCallsRegex = dynamic([@'graph\\.microsoft\\.com\\/v1\\.0\\/me\\/drive\\/root\\:\\/Uploaded\\/.*\\:\\/content',@'graph\\.microsoft\\.com\\/v1\\.0\\/me\\/drive\\/root\\:\\/Downloaded\\/.*\\:\\/content']);\nCommonSecurityLog\n| where RequestURL has_any (oneDriveCalls) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[0]) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[1])\n| project TimeGenerated, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct, DeviceAction, DestinationDnsDomain, DestinationIP, RequestURL, SourceIP, SourceHostName, RequestClientApplication"
      },
      {
        "name": "4f0f3c2a-8d44-43f8-9d9a-5b1e0d5f2c11 — AWS Security Hub - Detect SQS Queue policy allowing public access",
        "description": "This query detects Amazon SQS queues with access policies that allow public (unauthenticated or cross-account unrestricted) access, using AWS Security Hub control SQS.3 findings. Publicly accessible queues can enable data exfiltration, unauthorized message injection, or disruption of workflows. (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "AWSSecurityHubFindings\n| where RecordState == \"ACTIVE\" and ComplianceStatus == \"FAILED\"\n| where tostring(AwsSecurityFindingGeneratorId) == \"security-control/SQS.3\"\n      or tostring(ComplianceSecurityControlId) == \"SQS.3\"\n| mv-expand Resource = Resources\n| where tostring(Resource.Type) == \"AwsSqsQueue\"\n| extend QueueArn = tostring(Resource.Id)\n| summarize TimeGenerated = max(TimeGenerated)\n    by AwsAccountId, AwsRegion, AwsSecurityFindingTitle, AwsSecurityFindingDescription,\n       AwsSecurityFindingId, ComplianceSecurityControlId, QueueArn"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "19f3674c-f4a1-43bb-a89c-e4c6212275e0 — GitHub Exfiltration via High Number of Repository Clones by User",
        "description": "(ESQL) Detects a high number of repository cloning actions by a single user within a short time frame. Adversaries may clone multiple repositories to exfiltrate sensitive data. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "from logs-github.audit-* metadata _id, _index, _version\n| where\n  data_stream.dataset == \"github.audit\" and event.type == \"change\" and event.action == \"git.clone\"\n| stats\n  Esql.event_count = COUNT(*),\n  Esql.github_org_values = values(github.org),\n  Esql.github_repo_values = values(github.repo),\n  Esql.github_repository_public_values = values(github.repository_public),\n  Esql.github_token_id_values = values(github.token_id),\n  Esql.github_user_agent_values = values(github.user_agent),\n  Esql.user_name_values = values(user.name),\n  Esql.agent_id_values = values(agent.id),\n  Esql.data_stream_dataset_values = values(data_stream.dataset),\n  Esql.data_stream_namespace_values = values(data_stream.namespace)\n\n  by user.name\n\n| keep Esql.*\n\n| where\n  Esql.event_count >= 25"
      },
      {
        "name": "098bd5cc-fd55-438f-b354-7d6cd9856a08 — High Number of Closed Pull Requests by User",
        "description": "(ESQL) Detects a high number of closed pull requests by a single user within a short time frame. Adversaries may close multiple pull requests to disrupt development workflows or hide malicious changes. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "from logs-github.audit-* metadata _id, _index, _version\n| where\n  data_stream.dataset == \"github.audit\" and\n  github.category == \"pull_request\" and\n  event.type == \"change\" and\n  event.action == \"pull_request.close\"\n| stats\n  Esql.document_count = COUNT(*),\n  Esql.github_org_values = values(github.org),\n  Esql.github_repo_values = values(github.repo),\n  Esql.github_user_agent_values = values(github.user_agent),\n  Esql.github_pull_request_url_values = values(github.pull_request_url),\n  Esql.user_name_values = values(user.name),\n  Esql.agent_id_values = values(agent.id),\n  Esql.data_stream_dataset_values = values(data_stream.dataset),\n  Esql.data_stream_namespace_values = values(data_stream.namespace)\n\n  by user.name\n\n| keep Esql.*\n\n| where\n  Esql.document_count >= 10"
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Exfiltration Over Web Service activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}