T1569 — System Services

# T1569 - System Services

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate System Services activity in the context of Execution: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stop and delete the malicious service: sc stop <name> then | Low | No | Yes |
| Delete or quarantine the service binary | Low | No | Yes |
| If PsExec: investigate the origin host — it is the attacker' | Low | No | Yes |
| Check for additional services created in the same time windo | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let SuspiciousServiceNames = dynamic([
    "PSEXESVC",
    "PAExec",
    "RemComSvc",
    "WinExeSvc"
]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(5m)
| where FileName in~ ("services.exe", "sc.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspiciousServiceNames) or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspiciousServiceNames)
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    DeviceName,
    DeviceId,
    AccountName,
    FileName,
    ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessAccountName,
    InitiatingProcessRemoteSessionDeviceName
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,
         HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,
         AccountCustomEntity = AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```
```kql
let files1 = dynamic(["C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\lsa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pc.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\Rar.exe"]);
let files2 = dynamic(["svchost.exe","wdmsvc.exe"]);
let FileHash1 = dynamic(["43109fbe8b752f7a9076eaafa417d9ae5c6e827cd5374b866672263fdebd5ec3", "ab50d8d707b97712178a92bbac74ccc2a5699eb41c17aa77f713ff3e568dcedb", "010e32be0f86545e116a8bc3381a8428933eb8789f32c261c81fd5e7857d4a77",     "56cd102b9fc7f3523dad01d632525ff673259dbc9a091be0feff333c931574f7"]);
let FileHash2 = dynamic(["2a1044e9e6e87a032f80c6d9ea6ae61bbbb053c0a21b186ecb3b812b49eb03b7", "9ab7e99ed84f94a7b6409b87e56dc6e1143b05034a5e4455e8c555dbbcd0d2dd", "18a072ccfab239e140d8f682e2874e8ff19d94311fc8bb9564043d3e0deda54b"]);
imProcessCreate
| where ((Process has_any (files1)) and (ActingProcessSHA256 has_any (FileHash1))) or ((Process has_any (files2)) and (ActingProcessSHA256 has_any (FileHash2)))
// Increase risk score if recent alerts for the host
| join kind=leftouter (
  SecurityAlert
  | where ProviderName =~ "MDATP"
  | extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
  | mv-expand todynamic(Entities)
  | extend DvcId = tostring(parse_json(Entities).MdatpDeviceId)
  | where isnotempty(DvcId)
  // Higher risk score are for Defender alerts related to threat actor
  | extend AlertRiskScore = iif(ThreatName has_any ("Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A", "Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A!dll", "Trojan:MSIL/Mimikatz.BA!MTB"), 1.0, 0.5)
  | project DvcId, AlertRiskScore) 
  on DvcId
| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(isempty(AlertRiskScore), 0.0, AlertRiskScore)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\')[0])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Dvc, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Dvc, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Dvc, DomainIndex + 1), Dvc)
| project-away DomainIndex
```
```kql
let files1 = dynamic(["C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\lsa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pc.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\Rar.exe"]);
let files2 = dynamic(["svchost.exe","wdmsvc.exe"]);
let FileHash1 = dynamic(["43109fbe8b752f7a9076eaafa417d9ae5c6e827cd5374b866672263fdebd5ec3", "ab50d8d707b97712178a92bbac74ccc2a5699eb41c17aa77f713ff3e568dcedb", "010e32be0f86545e116a8bc3381a8428933eb8789f32c261c81fd5e7857d4a77",         "56cd102b9fc7f3523dad01d632525ff673259dbc9a091be0feff333c931574f7"]);
let FileHash2 = dynamic(["2a1044e9e6e87a032f80c6d9ea6ae61bbbb053c0a21b186ecb3b812b49eb03b7", "9ab7e99ed84f94a7b6409b87e56dc6e1143b05034a5e4455e8c555dbbcd0d2dd", "18a072ccfab239e140d8f682e2874e8ff19d94311fc8bb9564043d3e0deda54b"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ( FolderPath has_any (files1) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash1)) or (FolderPath has_any (files2) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash2))
| extend DvcId = DeviceId
| join kind=leftouter (SecurityAlert
| where ProviderName =~ "MDATP"
| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| mv-expand todynamic(Entities)
| extend DvcId = tostring(parse_json(Entities).MdatpDeviceId)
| where isnotempty(DvcId)
// Higher risk score are for Defender alerts related to threat actor
| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(ThreatName has_any ("Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A", "Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A!dll", "Trojan:MSIL/Mimikatz.BA!MTB"), 1.0, 0.5)
| project DvcId, AlertRiskScore) on DvcId
| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(isempty(AlertRiskScore), 0.0, AlertRiskScore)
| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, "\\", InitiatingProcessAccountName)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
```

## Escalation Criteria
- System Services activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1569.json
• /api/recommendations/T1569.json
• /api/d3fend/T1569.json
• /api/mappings/T1569.json
• /api/confluence/T1569.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1569.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1569",
  "name": "System Services",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "complete",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Execution"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Windows",
    "macOS",
    "Linux"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate System Services activity in the context of Execution: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-NTA",
      "name": "Network Traffic Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Sentinel",
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed system services activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"PsExec-Style Remote Service Creation\" -- Flags remote service creation consistent with PsExec/PAExec-style lateral movement tooling."
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Stop and delete the malicious service: sc stop <name> then",
      "category": "Response",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "See investigation guide",
      "notes": "Stop and delete the malicious service: sc stop <name> then sc delete <name>"
    },
    {
      "name": "Delete or quarantine the service binary",
      "category": "Response",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "See investigation guide"
    },
    {
      "name": "If PsExec: investigate the origin host — it is the attacker'",
      "category": "Response",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "See investigation guide",
      "notes": "If PsExec: investigate the origin host — it is the attacker's current position"
    },
    {
      "name": "Check for additional services created in the same time windo",
      "category": "Response",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "See investigation guide",
      "notes": "Check for additional services created in the same time window"
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "GEN-LM-002 — PsExec-Style Remote Service Creation",
        "description": "Flags remote service creation consistent with PsExec/PAExec-style lateral movement tooling. (Source: Bell Integration baseline detection library, mapped via sub-technique T1569.002.)",
        "query": "let SuspiciousServiceNames = dynamic([\n    \"PSEXESVC\",\n    \"PAExec\",\n    \"RemComSvc\",\n    \"WinExeSvc\"\n]);\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(5m)\n| where FileName in~ (\"services.exe\", \"sc.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspiciousServiceNames) or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspiciousServiceNames)\n| project\n    TimeGenerated,\n    DeviceName,\n    DeviceId,\n    AccountName,\n    FileName,\n    ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName,\n    InitiatingProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessAccountName,\n    InitiatingProcessRemoteSessionDeviceName\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated,\n         HostCustomEntity = DeviceName,\n         AccountCustomEntity = AccountName\n| order by TimeGenerated desc"
      },
      {
        "name": "29a29e5d-354e-4f5e-8321-8b39d25047bf — Dev-0228 File Path Hashes November 2021 (ASIM Version)",
        "description": "This hunting query looks for file paths/hashes related to observed activity by Dev-0228. The actor is known to use custom version of popular tool like PsExec, Procdump etc. to carry its activity. The risk score associated with each result is based on a number of factors, hosts with higher risk events should be investigated first. This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel Information Model - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/normalization' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let files1 = dynamic([\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\lsa.exe\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\pa.exe\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\pc.exe\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\Rar.exe\"]);\nlet files2 = dynamic([\"svchost.exe\",\"wdmsvc.exe\"]);\nlet FileHash1 = dynamic([\"43109fbe8b752f7a9076eaafa417d9ae5c6e827cd5374b866672263fdebd5ec3\", \"ab50d8d707b97712178a92bbac74ccc2a5699eb41c17aa77f713ff3e568dcedb\", \"010e32be0f86545e116a8bc3381a8428933eb8789f32c261c81fd5e7857d4a77\",     \"56cd102b9fc7f3523dad01d632525ff673259dbc9a091be0feff333c931574f7\"]);\nlet FileHash2 = dynamic([\"2a1044e9e6e87a032f80c6d9ea6ae61bbbb053c0a21b186ecb3b812b49eb03b7\", \"9ab7e99ed84f94a7b6409b87e56dc6e1143b05034a5e4455e8c555dbbcd0d2dd\", \"18a072ccfab239e140d8f682e2874e8ff19d94311fc8bb9564043d3e0deda54b\"]);\nimProcessCreate\n| where ((Process has_any (files1)) and (ActingProcessSHA256 has_any (FileHash1))) or ((Process has_any (files2)) and (ActingProcessSHA256 has_any (FileHash2)))\n// Increase risk score if recent alerts for the host\n| join kind=leftouter (\n  SecurityAlert\n  | where ProviderName =~ \"MDATP\"\n  | extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)\n  | mv-expand todynamic(Entities)\n  | extend DvcId = tostring(parse_json(Entities).MdatpDeviceId)\n  | where isnotempty(DvcId)\n  // Higher risk score are for Defender alerts related to threat actor\n  | extend AlertRiskScore = iif(ThreatName has_any (\"Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A\", \"Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A!dll\", \"Trojan:MSIL/Mimikatz.BA!MTB\"), 1.0, 0.5)\n  | project DvcId, AlertRiskScore) \n  on DvcId\n| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(isempty(AlertRiskScore), 0.0, AlertRiskScore)\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\\')[0])\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Dvc, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Dvc, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Dvc, DomainIndex + 1), Dvc)\n| project-away DomainIndex"
      },
      {
        "name": "3b443f22-9be9-4c35-ac70-a94757748439 — Dev-0228 File Path Hashes November 2021",
        "description": "This hunting query looks for file paths/hashes related to observed activity by Dev-0228. The actor is known to use custom version of popular tool like PsExec, Procdump etc. to carry its activity. The risk score associated with each result is based on a number of factors, hosts with higher risk events should be investigated first.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let files1 = dynamic([\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\lsa.exe\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\pa.exe\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\pc.exe\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\Rar.exe\"]);\nlet files2 = dynamic([\"svchost.exe\",\"wdmsvc.exe\"]);\nlet FileHash1 = dynamic([\"43109fbe8b752f7a9076eaafa417d9ae5c6e827cd5374b866672263fdebd5ec3\", \"ab50d8d707b97712178a92bbac74ccc2a5699eb41c17aa77f713ff3e568dcedb\", \"010e32be0f86545e116a8bc3381a8428933eb8789f32c261c81fd5e7857d4a77\",         \"56cd102b9fc7f3523dad01d632525ff673259dbc9a091be0feff333c931574f7\"]);\nlet FileHash2 = dynamic([\"2a1044e9e6e87a032f80c6d9ea6ae61bbbb053c0a21b186ecb3b812b49eb03b7\", \"9ab7e99ed84f94a7b6409b87e56dc6e1143b05034a5e4455e8c555dbbcd0d2dd\", \"18a072ccfab239e140d8f682e2874e8ff19d94311fc8bb9564043d3e0deda54b\"]);\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where ( FolderPath has_any (files1) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash1)) or (FolderPath has_any (files2) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash2))\n| extend DvcId = DeviceId\n| join kind=leftouter (SecurityAlert\n| where ProviderName =~ \"MDATP\"\n| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)\n| mv-expand todynamic(Entities)\n| extend DvcId = tostring(parse_json(Entities).MdatpDeviceId)\n| where isnotempty(DvcId)\n// Higher risk score are for Defender alerts related to threat actor\n| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(ThreatName has_any (\"Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A\", \"Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A!dll\", \"Trojan:MSIL/Mimikatz.BA!MTB\"), 1.0, 0.5)\n| project DvcId, AlertRiskScore) on DvcId\n| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(isempty(AlertRiskScore), 0.0, AlertRiskScore)\n| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, \"\\\\\", InitiatingProcessAccountName)\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "e2f9fdf5-8076-45ad-9427-41e0e03dc9c2 — Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable",
        "description": "(EQL) Identifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service that has been renamed, possibly to evade detection. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "process where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.type == \"start\" and\n  process.pe.original_file_name : \"psexesvc.exe\" and not process.name : \"PSEXESVC.exe\""
      },
      {
        "name": "d33ea3bf-9a11-463e-bd46-f648f2a0f4b1 — Remote Windows Service Installed",
        "description": "(EQL) Identifies a network logon followed by Windows service creation with same LogonId. This could be indicative of lateral movement, but will be noisy if commonly done by administrators.\" (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "sequence by winlog.logon.id, winlog.computer_name with maxspan=1m\n[authentication where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.action == \"logged-in\" and winlog.logon.type : \"Network\" and\n event.outcome == \"success\" and source.ip != null and source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\"]\n[iam where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.action == \"service-installed\" and\n not winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId : \"0x3e7\" and\n not winlog.event_data.ServiceFileName :\n               (\"?:\\\\Windows\\\\ADCR_Agent\\\\adcrsvc.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VSSVC.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\TrustedInstaller.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\*.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Program Files\\\\*.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\PSEXESVC.EXE\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\sppsvc.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiApSrv.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\RemoteAuditService.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\VeeamVssSupport\\\\VeeamGuestHelper.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\VeeamLogShipper\\\\VeeamLogShipper.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\CAInvokerService.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\upfc.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\AdminArsenal\\\\PDQ*.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\vds.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\Veeam\\\\Backup\\\\VeeamDeploymentSvc.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\ProPatches\\\\Scheduler\\\\STSchedEx.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\certsrv.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\eset-remote-install-service.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Pella Corporation\\\\Pella Order Management\\\\GPAutoSvc.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Pella Corporation\\\\OSCToGPAutoService\\\\OSCToGPAutoSvc.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Pella Corporation\\\\Pella Order Management\\\\GPAutoSvc.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\NwxExeSvc\\\\NwxExeSvc.exe\",\n                \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\taskhostex.exe\")]"
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "System Services activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1569 - System Services Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}