T1587 — Develop Capabilities

# T1587 - Develop Capabilities

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Develop Capabilities activity in the context of Resource Development: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
CiscoSyslogUTD
| where isnotempty(Malware) and Malware != "None"
| distinct Malware, SourceIP
| join kind=inner (CiscoSDWANNetflow
| where isnotempty(NetflowUsername)
| summarize arg_max(TimeStamp, NetflowUsername) by NetflowFwSrcAddrIpv4
| distinct 
    ["Username"] = NetflowUsername,
    ["SourceIP"] = NetflowFwSrcAddrIpv4) on SourceIP
| project Malware, SourceIP, Username
```
```kql
// High severity - Social and Public Exposure - Source Code Exposure on Public Repositories
let timeFrame = 5m;
CyfirmaSPESourceCodeAlerts_CL
| where severity == 'Critical' and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
| extend
    Description=description,
    FirstSeen=first_seen,
    LastSeen=last_seen,
    RiskScore=risk_score,
    AlertUID=alert_uid,
    UID=uid,
    AssetType=asset_type,
    AssetValue=signature,
    Source=source,
    Impact=impact,
    Recommendation=recommendation,
    ProviderName='CYFIRMA',
    ProductName='DeCYFIR/DeTCT',
    AlertTitle=Alert_title
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    Description,
    RiskScore,
    FirstSeen,
    LastSeen,
    AlertUID,
    UID,
    AssetType,
    AssetValue,
    Impact,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName,
    AlertTitle
```
```kql
// Medium severity - Social and Public Exposure - Source Code Exposure on Public Repositories
let timeFrame = 5m;
CyfirmaSPESourceCodeAlerts_CL
| where severity == 'High' and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
| extend
    Description=description,
    FirstSeen=first_seen,
    LastSeen=last_seen,
    RiskScore=risk_score,
    AlertUID=alert_uid,
    UID=uid,
    AssetType=asset_type,
    AssetValue=signature,
    Source=source,
    Impact=impact,
    Recommendation=recommendation,
    ProviderName='CYFIRMA',
    ProductName='DeCYFIR/DeTCT',
    AlertTitle=Alert_title
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    Description,
    RiskScore,
    FirstSeen,
    LastSeen,
    AlertUID,
    UID,
    AssetType,
    AssetValue,
    Impact,
    ProductName,
    ProviderName,
    AlertTitle
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Develop Capabilities activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1587.json
• /api/recommendations/T1587.json
• /api/d3fend/T1587.json
• /api/mappings/T1587.json
• /api/confluence/T1587.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1587.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1587",
  "name": "Develop Capabilities",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "PRE"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Develop Capabilities activity in the context of Resource Development: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-NTA",
      "name": "Network Traffic Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Sentinel",
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed develop capabilities activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"Cisco SDWAN - Maleware Events\" -- This analytic rule will monitor Malware Events in Syslog and Netflow Data'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "cb14defd-3415-4420-a2e4-2dd0f3e07a86 — Cisco SDWAN - Maleware Events",
        "description": "This analytic rule will monitor Malware Events in Syslog and Netflow Data' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed), mapped via sub-technique T1587.001.)",
        "query": "CiscoSyslogUTD\n| where isnotempty(Malware) and Malware != \"None\"\n| distinct Malware, SourceIP\n| join kind=inner (CiscoSDWANNetflow\n| where isnotempty(NetflowUsername)\n| summarize arg_max(TimeStamp, NetflowUsername) by NetflowFwSrcAddrIpv4\n| distinct \n    [\"Username\"] = NetflowUsername,\n    [\"SourceIP\"] = NetflowFwSrcAddrIpv4) on SourceIP\n| project Malware, SourceIP, Username"
      },
      {
        "name": "42e6f16a-7773-44cc-8668-8f648bd1aa4f — CYFIRMA - Social and Public Exposure - Source Code Exposure on Public Repositories Rule",
        "description": "\"This rule triggers when CYFIRMA detects source code related to internal or enterprise domains exposed on public platforms like GitHub. Such exposure may lead to intellectual property leakage or help adversaries understand internal systems, increasing the risk of targeted attacks.\" (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed), mapped via sub-technique T1587.001.)",
        "query": "// High severity - Social and Public Exposure - Source Code Exposure on Public Repositories\nlet timeFrame = 5m;\nCyfirmaSPESourceCodeAlerts_CL\n| where severity == 'Critical' and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())\n| extend\n    Description=description,\n    FirstSeen=first_seen,\n    LastSeen=last_seen,\n    RiskScore=risk_score,\n    AlertUID=alert_uid,\n    UID=uid,\n    AssetType=asset_type,\n    AssetValue=signature,\n    Source=source,\n    Impact=impact,\n    Recommendation=recommendation,\n    ProviderName='CYFIRMA',\n    ProductName='DeCYFIR/DeTCT',\n    AlertTitle=Alert_title\n| project\n    TimeGenerated,\n    Description,\n    RiskScore,\n    FirstSeen,\n    LastSeen,\n    AlertUID,\n    UID,\n    AssetType,\n    AssetValue,\n    Impact,\n    ProductName,\n    ProviderName,\n    AlertTitle"
      },
      {
        "name": "28e315a3-725d-4261-a6c2-e597d51541f4 — CYFIRMA - Social and Public Exposure - Source Code Exposure on Public Repositories Rule",
        "description": "\"This rule triggers when CYFIRMA detects source code related to internal or enterprise domains exposed on public platforms like GitHub. Such exposure may lead to intellectual property leakage or help adversaries understand internal systems, increasing the risk of targeted attacks.\" (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed), mapped via sub-technique T1587.001.)",
        "query": "// Medium severity - Social and Public Exposure - Source Code Exposure on Public Repositories\nlet timeFrame = 5m;\nCyfirmaSPESourceCodeAlerts_CL\n| where severity == 'High' and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())\n| extend\n    Description=description,\n    FirstSeen=first_seen,\n    LastSeen=last_seen,\n    RiskScore=risk_score,\n    AlertUID=alert_uid,\n    UID=uid,\n    AssetType=asset_type,\n    AssetValue=signature,\n    Source=source,\n    Impact=impact,\n    Recommendation=recommendation,\n    ProviderName='CYFIRMA',\n    ProductName='DeCYFIR/DeTCT',\n    AlertTitle=Alert_title\n| project\n    TimeGenerated,\n    Description,\n    RiskScore,\n    FirstSeen,\n    LastSeen,\n    AlertUID,\n    UID,\n    AssetType,\n    AssetValue,\n    Impact,\n    ProductName,\n    ProviderName,\n    AlertTitle"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f123456789ab — GenAI Process Compiling or Generating Executables",
        "description": "(EQL) Detects when GenAI tools spawn compilers or packaging tools to generate executables. Attackers leverage local LLMs to autonomously generate and compile malware, droppers, or implants. Python packaging tools (pyinstaller, nuitka, pyarmor) are particularly high-risk as they create standalone executables that can be deployed without dependencies... (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "process where event.type == \"start\" and\n\n  // GenAI parent process\n  (\n    process.parent.name in (\n      \"ollama.exe\", \"ollama\", \"Ollama\",\n      \"textgen.exe\", \"textgen\", \"text-generation-webui.exe\", \"oobabooga.exe\",\n      \"lmstudio.exe\", \"lmstudio\", \"LM Studio\",\n      \"claude.exe\", \"claude\", \"Claude\",\n      \"cursor.exe\", \"cursor\", \"Cursor\", \"Cursor Helper\", \"Cursor Helper (Plugin)\",\n      \"copilot.exe\", \"copilot\", \"Copilot\",\n      \"codex.exe\", \"codex\",\n      \"Jan\", \"jan.exe\", \"jan\", \"Jan Helper\",\n      \"gpt4all.exe\", \"gpt4all\", \"GPT4All\",\n      \"gemini-cli.exe\", \"gemini-cli\",\n      \"genaiscript.exe\", \"genaiscript\",\n      \"grok.exe\", \"grok\",\n      \"qwen.exe\", \"qwen\",\n      \"koboldcpp.exe\", \"koboldcpp\", \"KoboldCpp\",\n      \"llama-server\", \"llama-cli\"\n    ) or\n    \n    // Node/Deno with GenAI frameworks\n    (process.parent.name in (\"node.exe\", \"node\", \"deno.exe\", \"deno\") and\n     process.parent.command_line like~ (\"*mcp-server*\", \"*@modelcontextprotocol*\", \"*langchain*\", \"*autogpt*\", \"*babyagi*\", \"*agentgpt*\", \"*crewai*\", \"*semantic-kernel*\", \"*llama-index*\", \"*haystack*\")) or\n    \n    // Python with GenAI frameworks\n    (process.parent.name like~ \"python*\" and\n     process.parent.command_line like~ (\"*langchain*\", \"*autogpt*\", \"*babyagi*\", \"*agentgpt*\", \"*crewai*\", \"*semantic-kernel*\", \"*llama-index*\", \"*haystack*\"))\n  ) and\n\n  // Compilation tools\n  (\n    // Python packaging\n    process.name in (\"pyinstaller\", \"py2exe\", \"cx_Freeze\", \"nuitka\", \"pyarmor\", \"pkg\") or\n    \n    // C/C++ compilation with output\n    (process.name in (\"gcc\", \"g++\", \"clang\", \"clang++\", \"cl.exe\") and\n     process.command_line like~ \"*-o *\" and\n     process.command_line like~ (\"*.c *\", \"*.c\", \"*.cpp *\", \"*.cpp\", \"*.cc *\", \"*.cc\", \"*.m *\", \"*.m\") and\n     not process.command_line like~ \"*git*\") or\n    \n    // Go compilation\n    (process.name == \"go\" and process.args == \"build\") or\n    \n    // Rust compilation\n    (process.name == \"cargo\" and process.args == \"build\") or\n    (process.name == \"rustc\" and process.command_line like~ \"*-o *\") or\n    \n    // .NET compilation\n    process.name in (\"csc.exe\", \"vbc.exe\", \"msbuild.exe\") or\n    (process.name == \"dotnet\" and process.args == \"build\") or\n    \n    // Java compilation\n    process.name == \"javac\"\n  )"
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Develop Capabilities activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1587 - Develop Capabilities Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}