T1591 — Gather Victim Org Information

# T1591 - Gather Victim Org Information

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Gather Victim Org Information activity in the context of Reconnaissance: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
let timeframe = 24h;
BitSightGraphData
| where ingestion_time() > ago(timeframe)and toint(RatingDifferance) < 0
| extend percentage = -(toreal(RatingDifferance)/toreal(Rating))*100
| where percentage >= 10
| project RatingDate, Rating, CompanyName, percentage
```
```kql
let timeframe = 24h;
BitSightGraphData
| where ingestion_time() > ago(timeframe)
| where toint(RatingDifferance) < 0
| project RatingDate, Rating, CompanyName, RatingDifferance
```
```kql
// High severity - Social Media Handle Impersonation
let timeFrame = 5m;
CyfirmaBISocialHandlersAlerts_CL 
  | where severity == 'Critical' and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())
  | extend
      Description=description,
      FirstSeen=first_seen,
      LastSeen=last_seen,
      RiskScore=risk_score,
      AlertUID=alert_uid,
      UID=uid,
      AssetType=asset_type,
      AssetValue=asset_value,
      Impact=impact,
      Recommendation=recommendation,
      SourceSype=source_type,
      ProviderName="CYFIRMA",
      ProductName="DeCYFIR/DeTCT"
  | project 
      TimeGenerated,
      Description,
      RiskScore,
      FirstSeen,
      LastSeen,
      AlertUID,
      UID,
      AssetType,
      AssetValue,
      Impact,
      Recommendation,
      SourceSype,
      ProductName,
      ProviderName
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Gather Victim Org Information activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1591.json
• /api/recommendations/T1591.json
• /api/d3fend/T1591.json
• /api/mappings/T1591.json
• /api/confluence/T1591.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1591.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1591",
  "name": "Gather Victim Org Information",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "PRE"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Gather Victim Org Information activity in the context of Reconnaissance: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-NTA",
      "name": "Network Traffic Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Sentinel",
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed gather victim org information activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"BitSight - drop in company ratings\" -- Rule helps to detect when there is a drop of 10% or more in BitSight company ratings.'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "d8844f11-3a36-4b97-9062-1e6d57c00e37 — BitSight - drop in company ratings",
        "description": "Rule helps to detect when there is a drop of 10% or more in BitSight company ratings.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let timeframe = 24h;\nBitSightGraphData\n| where ingestion_time() > ago(timeframe)and toint(RatingDifferance) < 0\n| extend percentage = -(toreal(RatingDifferance)/toreal(Rating))*100\n| where percentage >= 10\n| project RatingDate, Rating, CompanyName, percentage"
      },
      {
        "name": "b11fdc35-6368-4cc0-8128-52cd2e2cdda0 — BitSight - drop in the headline rating",
        "description": "Rule helps to detect if headline ratings is drop in BitSight.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "let timeframe = 24h;\nBitSightGraphData\n| where ingestion_time() > ago(timeframe)\n| where toint(RatingDifferance) < 0\n| project RatingDate, Rating, CompanyName, RatingDifferance"
      },
      {
        "name": "22f49d67-7da7-4809-8d07-89e4478aa6b0 — CYFIRMA - Brand Intelligence - Social Media Handle Impersonation Detected High Rule",
        "description": "\"Detects high-severity alerts related to impersonation of official social media handles associated with your brand. These spoofed accounts may be used for phishing, disinformation, or fraud campaigns, posing significant reputational and security risks.\" (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed), mapped via sub-technique T1591.002.)",
        "query": "// High severity - Social Media Handle Impersonation\nlet timeFrame = 5m;\nCyfirmaBISocialHandlersAlerts_CL \n  | where severity == 'Critical' and TimeGenerated between (ago(timeFrame) .. now())\n  | extend\n      Description=description,\n      FirstSeen=first_seen,\n      LastSeen=last_seen,\n      RiskScore=risk_score,\n      AlertUID=alert_uid,\n      UID=uid,\n      AssetType=asset_type,\n      AssetValue=asset_value,\n      Impact=impact,\n      Recommendation=recommendation,\n      SourceSype=source_type,\n      ProviderName=\"CYFIRMA\",\n      ProductName=\"DeCYFIR/DeTCT\"\n  | project \n      TimeGenerated,\n      Description,\n      RiskScore,\n      FirstSeen,\n      LastSeen,\n      AlertUID,\n      UID,\n      AssetType,\n      AssetValue,\n      Impact,\n      Recommendation,\n      SourceSype,\n      ProductName,\n      ProviderName"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": []
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Gather Victim Org Information activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1591 - Gather Victim Org Information Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}