T1610 — Deploy Container

# T1610 - Deploy Container

## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Deploy Container activity in the context of Execution: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.

## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |

## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.

## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts

## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |

## KQL
```kql
Alerts_docker  
| where Service == "docker" 
| extend MappedSeverity = Severity
```

## Escalation Criteria
- Deploy Container activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.

## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.

Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.

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• /api/techniques/T1610.json
• /api/recommendations/T1610.json
• /api/d3fend/T1610.json
• /api/mappings/T1610.json
• /api/confluence/T1610.md

Example curl:

curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1610.json

Response:

{
  "technique_id": "T1610",
  "name": "Deploy Container",
  "priority": "high",
  "status": "draft",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
  "generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
  "tactics": [
    "Execution"
  ],
  "platforms": [
    "Containers"
  ],
  "summary": "Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment...",
  "soc_recommendation": "Investigate Deploy Container activity in the context of Execution: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
  "d3fend_mappings": [
    {
      "id": "D3-NTA",
      "name": "Network Traffic Analysis",
      "relationship": "detect",
      "practical_action": "Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
      "tooling": [
        "Sentinel",
        "Defender for Endpoint"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "investigation_steps": {
    "microsoft": [
      "Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
      "Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
      "Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
    ],
    "generic": [
      "Confirm whether the observed deploy container activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
      "Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
      "Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.",
      "Real detection reference: \"Cyble Vision Alerts Docker\" -- Detects Docker Hub container entries related to monitored keywords. Uses Alerts_docker parser. Includes metadata such as developer, stars, downloads, and image URL. Raises one incident per alert.'"
    ]
  },
  "evidence_to_collect": [
    "Host or resource affected",
    "Account or identity involved",
    "Timestamp of the activity",
    "Related process, file, or network artifact",
    "Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
  ],
  "response_actions": [
    {
      "name": "Contain the affected host or account",
      "category": "Containment",
      "risk": "Medium",
      "automation_safe": false,
      "approval_required": true,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
      "notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
    },
    {
      "name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
      "category": "Investigation",
      "risk": "Low",
      "automation_safe": true,
      "approval_required": false,
      "tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
      "notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
    }
  ],
  "queries": {
    "kql": [
      {
        "name": "47dee28d-fa74-49cd-b5fb-397b047a73c0 — Cyble Vision Alerts Docker",
        "description": "Detects Docker Hub container entries related to monitored keywords. Uses Alerts_docker parser. Includes metadata such as developer, stars, downloads, and image URL. Raises one incident per alert.' (Source: Microsoft's official Azure-Sentinel Detections (MIT licensed).)",
        "query": "Alerts_docker  \n| where Service == \"docker\" \n| extend MappedSeverity = Severity"
      }
    ],
    "spl": [],
    "esql": [
      {
        "name": "d1f310cb-5921-4d37-bbdf-cfdab7a6df9c — Privileged Container Creation with Host Directory Mount",
        "description": "(EQL) This rule detects the creation of privileged containers that mount host directories into the container's filesystem. Such configurations can be exploited by attackers to escape the container isolation and gain access to the host system, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment. (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "process where event.type == \"start\" and event.action in (\"exec\", \"exec_event\", \"start\", \"ProcessRollup2\", \"executed\", \"process_started\") and\nprocess.name == \"docker\" and process.args == \"--privileged\" and process.args == \"run\" and\nprocess.args == \"-v\" and process.args like \"/:/*\" and\nnot (\n  (process.args == \"aktosecurity/mirror-api-logging:k8s_ebpf\" and process.args == \"akto-api-security-traffic-collector\") or\n  (process.args like \"goharbor/prepare:*\" and process.args in (\"/:/hostfs\", \"/:/hostfs/\"))\n)"
      },
      {
        "name": "afe6b0eb-dd9d-4922-b08a-1910124d524d — Potential Privilege Escalation via Container Misconfiguration",
        "description": "(EQL) This rule monitors for the execution of processes that interact with Linux containers through an interactive shell without root permissions. Utilities such as runc and ctr are universal command-line utilities leveraged to interact with containers via root permissions... (Source: Elastic's official detection-rules repository (Elastic License v2).)",
        "query": "process where host.os.type == \"linux\" and event.type == \"start\" and event.action == \"exec\" and (\n  (process.name == \"runc\" and process.args == \"run\") or\n  (process.name == \"ctr\" and process.args == \"run\" and process.args in (\"--privileged\", \"--mount\"))\n) and not user.Ext.real.id == \"0\" and not group.Ext.real.id == \"0\" and\nprocess.interactive == true and process.parent.interactive == true"
      }
    ]
  },
  "automation": {
    "safe": [
      "Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
      "Run enrichment queries.",
      "Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
    ],
    "approval_required": [
      "Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
      "Any change to production configuration."
    ]
  },
  "escalation_criteria": [
    "Deploy Container activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
    "Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
    "Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
  ],
  "false_positive_considerations": [
    "Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
    "Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
    "Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
  ],
  "confluence": {
    "title": "T1610 - Deploy Container Response Guidance",
    "labels": [
      "mitre",
      "attack",
      "d3fend",
      "secops",
      "basyrix"
    ],
    "sections": [
      "summary",
      "d3fend_mappings",
      "investigation_steps",
      "response_actions",
      "queries",
      "automation",
      "escalation_criteria",
      "false_positive_considerations"
    ]
  }
}