Reconnaissance
T1682 — Query Public AI Services
Adversaries may query publicly accessible artificial intelligence (AI) services, such as large language models (LLMs), to support targeting and operations. In addition to searching websites or databases directly (i.e., [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), adversaries may use AI services to synthesize, aggregate, and analyze publicly available information at scale...
Investigate Query Public AI Services activity in the context of Reconnaissance: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.
Platforms
PRE
Priority / status
medium / draft
Evidence to collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts
D3-NTA · detect
Network Traffic Analysis
Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.
Tooling: Sentinel, Defender for Endpoint
| ATT&CK Technique | D3FEND Technique | Practical SOC Action | Tooling |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1682 Query Public AI Services | Network Traffic Analysis | Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. | Sentinel, Defender for Endpoint |
T1682 Query Public AI Services → D3FEND → SOC action
Investigation steps — Microsoft
- Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
- Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
- Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.
Investigation steps — generic
- Confirm whether the observed query public ai services activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.
- Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.
- Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline.
Response actions
| Action | Risk | Automation safe | Approval required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |
KQL
Starting point for T1682
DeviceEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ActionType has "<tune to T1682>" Escalation criteria
- Query Public AI Services activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.
False positive considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.
# T1682 - Query Public AI Services
## SOC Recommendation
Investigate Query Public AI Services activity in the context of Reconnaissance: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.
## D3FEND Mappings
| D3FEND Technique | Relationship | Practical SOC Action |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Analysis | Detect | Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique. |
## Investigation Steps
1. Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.
2. Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.
3. Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource.
## Evidence to Collect
- Host or resource affected
- Account or identity involved
- Timestamp of the activity
- Related process, file, or network artifact
- Any preceding or follow-on alerts
## Response Actions
| Action | Risk | Automation Safe | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contain the affected host or account | Medium | No | Yes |
| Collect and preserve evidence | Low | Yes | No |
## KQL
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ActionType has "<tune to T1682>"
```
## Escalation Criteria
- Query Public AI Services activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.
- Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.
- Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent.
## False Positive Considerations
- Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.
- Approved security testing or red team exercise.
- Known benign software producing similar telemetry.
Generated by SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix.
Want to push this directly to Confluence? Upgrade to Basyrix Pro.
- /api/techniques/T1682.json
- /api/recommendations/T1682.json
- /api/d3fend/T1682.json
- /api/mappings/T1682.json
- /api/confluence/T1682.md
Example curl:
curl https://atlas.basyrix.com/api/recommendations/T1682.json Response:
{
"technique_id": "T1682",
"name": "Query Public AI Services",
"priority": "medium",
"status": "draft",
"version": "0.1.0",
"last_reviewed": "2026-07-23",
"generated_by": "SOC Response Atlas by Basyrix",
"tactics": [
"Reconnaissance"
],
"platforms": [
"PRE"
],
"summary": "Adversaries may query publicly accessible artificial intelligence (AI) services, such as large language models (LLMs), to support targeting and operations. In addition to searching websites or databases directly (i.e., [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), adversaries may use AI services to synthesize, aggregate, and analyze publicly available information at scale...",
"soc_recommendation": "Investigate Query Public AI Services activity in the context of Reconnaissance: confirm scope, affected host/identity, and whether it matches expected administrative behaviour before deciding this is benign.",
"d3fend_mappings": [
{
"id": "D3-NTA",
"name": "Network Traffic Analysis",
"relationship": "detect",
"practical_action": "Monitor for Network Traffic Analysis indicators relevant to this technique.",
"tooling": [
"Sentinel",
"Defender for Endpoint"
]
}
],
"investigation_steps": {
"microsoft": [
"Review Defender for Endpoint / Defender XDR alerts and timeline for the affected host or identity.",
"Check Sentinel analytics rules and incidents correlated with this technique.",
"Review Entra ID sign-in and audit logs if the technique involves an identity or cloud resource."
],
"generic": [
"Confirm whether the observed query public ai services activity matches expected administrative or application behaviour.",
"Identify the host, account, or resource where the activity occurred and its business criticality.",
"Check for related alerts before and after this activity to reconstruct the broader intrusion timeline."
]
},
"evidence_to_collect": [
"Host or resource affected",
"Account or identity involved",
"Timestamp of the activity",
"Related process, file, or network artifact",
"Any preceding or follow-on alerts"
],
"response_actions": [
{
"name": "Contain the affected host or account",
"category": "Containment",
"risk": "Medium",
"automation_safe": false,
"approval_required": true,
"tool": "Defender for Endpoint / Entra ID",
"notes": "Requires approval -- confirm malicious intent before isolating a host or disabling an account."
},
{
"name": "Collect and preserve evidence",
"category": "Investigation",
"risk": "Low",
"automation_safe": true,
"approval_required": false,
"tool": "Defender for Endpoint",
"notes": "Safe -- read-only evidence collection."
}
],
"queries": {
"kql": [
{
"name": "Starting point for T1682",
"description": "Generic starting query -- tune to the specific data source relevant to this technique.",
"query": "DeviceEvents\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)\n| where ActionType has \"<tune to T1682>\""
}
],
"spl": [],
"esql": []
},
"automation": {
"safe": [
"Add recommendation as Sentinel incident comment.",
"Run enrichment queries.",
"Create ServiceNow SecOps task."
],
"approval_required": [
"Contain or disable the affected host/account.",
"Any change to production configuration."
]
},
"escalation_criteria": [
"Query Public AI Services activity observed on a privileged account or critical system.",
"Activity follows or precedes other suspicious behaviour in the same investigation.",
"Automated triage cannot confidently rule out malicious intent."
],
"false_positive_considerations": [
"Legitimate administrative or maintenance activity matching this pattern.",
"Approved security testing or red team exercise.",
"Known benign software producing similar telemetry."
],
"confluence": {
"title": "T1682 - Query Public AI Services Response Guidance",
"labels": [
"mitre",
"attack",
"d3fend",
"secops",
"basyrix"
],
"sections": [
"summary",
"d3fend_mappings",
"investigation_steps",
"response_actions",
"queries",
"automation",
"escalation_criteria",
"false_positive_considerations"
]
}
}